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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Payette County, Idaho

Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077

JUN 2.s 2009
_ _ _ _ _.A.M.
BETIY J. DRESSEN
By
a~

P.M.

.

Deputy

Attomeys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,

-

Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT
FORM

Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
- 1

COME NOW, the above-captioned Defendants by and through their counsel of record,
Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and hereby submit the following requested supplemental jury
instructions based on IDJI.2d to include supplemental instructions numbers 14, 15,23,30,31,32,
33 and Defendants' Supplemental Requested Verdict Form. Defendants reserve the right to add,
delete, modify or supplement this list.
DATED this

~ day of June, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP

By

~/4d;.e<

Robert T. Wetherell, Ofthe Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

/

-~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
-tt,
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.zs day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

~~-=-.
Robert T. Wetherell

/'
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DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 14

In this case, Defendants allege that the Employment Contracts did not have a

lawful purpose to the extent they granted compensation to Plaintiffwithout closing on the
transaction.
The purpose for which the contracts were made, and the actions or non-actions
expected of the parties in order to perform under the contracts, must all be lawful when
the contracts were made.

IDJI6.03.1 (modified)

GIVEN_____________
REFUSED___________

MODIFIED- - - - - COVERED___________
OTHER_____________

1<500

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 15
A provision in the Employment Contracts entered into by Plaintiff and
Defendants states:
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall find
a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price and
terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, ... I hereby agree to
pay you in cash for your services a commission equal in amount to 5
percent of said selling price. Should a deposit or amounts paid on account
of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the
Broker, as the balance shall be paid to me. The Broker's share of any
forfeited deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase, however, shall
not exceed the commission.
This provision violates public policy and is unenforceable. In the state ofIdaho, a
real estate broker does not earn compensation until the purchaser completes the
transaction by closing the title in accordance with the provisions of the contract.

Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 257,846 P.2d 904 (1993);
Blaine County Title Associates v. One Hundred Building Corp., Inc., 138 Idaho 517, 66
P.3d 221 (2002).
COlmnercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & LYlID Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d
955 (2008).
GIVEN_____________
REFUSED __________
MODIFIED_ _ _ __
COVERED_________
OTHER- - - - - - - -

I<gO I

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 23

In this case the Defendants have asserted certain affinnative defenses.
Defendants' affinnative defenses are as follows:
1.

Any alleged claim Plaintiff has against Defendants for breach 0 f contract

has been waived by Plaintiff.
2.

Division of earnest monies are controlled under Idaho law by offers to

purchase and therefore, the Employment Contracts are unenforceable in regard to
division of earnest monies.
3.

In the offers to sell and purchase defendants entered into with

MidAmerican, Plaintiff agreed that Defendants were entitled to all earnest monies.
4.

Plaintiff s claims are barred by estoppel.

5.

Plaintiff is not entitled to recover compensation without closing on the

transaction.
6.

Plaintiff breached his fiduciary duties to Defendants.

If you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that anyone of these
defenses has been proven, then your verdict should be for the Defendants.
IDJI 6.10.4 (modified)
GIVEN_____________
REFUSED__________
MODIFIED- - - - - COVERED__________
OTHER- - - - - - - -

Iff)~

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 30

Defendants / Counterclaimaints / Third Party Plaintiffs, Richard A. Robertson and
Johnnie L. Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. have the burden ofproving only one
of the following propositions on their claim that Counterdefendant, Knipe Land Company
and Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act by:
1.

Failing to deliver to Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, Inc. legible

copies of the Employment Contracts at the time Robertsons and Robertson Kennels,
Inc's signatures were obtained.
2.

Engaging in any act or practice which was otherwise misleading, false or

deceptive to Robertsons and/or Robertson Kennels, Inc.
3.

Engaging in any unconscionable method, act or practice when providing

real estate services to Robertsons and/or Robertson Kennels, Inc.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that anyone of these
propositions has been proven, then your verdict on the Third Party Complaint should be
for Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Richard Robertson and Johnnie Robertson, and
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
You are to assume that Plaintiff provided services to Defendants, and that
Defendants are consumers under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
Idaho Code §§ 48-602(2) and 48-603(13), (17) and (18).

GIVEN_____________
REFUSED- - - - - - MODIFIED______
COVERED___________
OTHER______________

/

IfD3

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.

2l

As a general rule, an agent or broker who breaches fiduciary duties forfeits the
entire compensation.

Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637,39 P.3d 577 (2001)
GIVEN_____________
REFUSED__________
MODIFIED_ _ _ _ __
COVERED___________
OTHER___________

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.

31. .

Every contract contains a duty of reasonable performance. The covenant of good
faith and fair dealing requires Third-Party Defendant John Knipe to perform in good faith
the obligations contained in the parties' agreements.

Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d
955 (2008).
GIVEN_____________
REFUSED__________
MODIFIED_______
COVERED__________
OTHER~___________

33

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. - -

If Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant John Knipe's act which proximately caused injury to the
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs were an extreme deviation from reasonable standards
of conduct and that these acts were malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or outrageous, you
may, in addition to any compensatory damages to which you find the Defendants/ThirdParty Plaintiffs entitled, award to Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs an amount which will
punish the Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant John Knipe and deter him and others from
engaging in similar conduct in the future.

IDJI 9.20 (Alternate)
GIVEN_____________

REFUSED__________
MOD IF IED_________
COVERED___________
OTHER._____________

liOb

DEFENDANTS' I THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED VERDICT FORM

QUESTION NO.1: Did a valid contract exist between Plaintiff and Defendants?
ANSWER TO QUESTION 1: YES [ ]

NO [ ]

If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 6. If you answered this question
"yes," then continue to the next question.
QUESTION NO.2: Did Defendants breach the contract?
ANSWER TO QUESTION 2: YES [ ]

NO [ ]

If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 6. If you answered this question
"yes," then continue to the next question.
QUESTION NO.3: Has Plaintiffbeen damaged on account of the breach?
ANSWER TO OUESTION 3: YES [ ]

NO [ ]

If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 6. If you answered this question
"yes," then continue to the next question.
QUESTION NO.4: Did the Defendants prove anyone of their affirmative defenses?
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.4: YES [ ]

NO [ ]

If you answered this question "no," then continue to the next question. If you answered
this questions "yes," then go to Question 6.
QUESTION NO.5: What are Plaintiff's damages?
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.5: Amount: $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
QUESTION NO.6: Did Third-Party Defendant, John Knipe, violate the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act with respect to Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Richard and Johlmie
Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc.?
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.6: YES [ ]

NO [ ]

If you answered this question "yes," then continue to the next question. If you answered
this questions "no," then go to Question 8.

/~(J'7

QUESTION NO.7: What are Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Richard and Johnnie
Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc.' s damages?
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.7: Amount: $ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
QUESTION NO.8: Did the Third-Party Defendant, John Knipe, take and convert
$22,500.00 belonging to Defendants / Third-party Plaintiffs Richard and Johnnie
Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. for his own use?
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 8: YES [ ]

NO [ ]

If you answered this question "yes," then continue to the next question, if you answered
"no," you are done. Sign the Verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff.
QUESTION NO.9: What are Defendants / Third-Party Plaintiffs' damages?
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.9: Amount: $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(Please see the next page.)

You are now done. Sign the Verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff.

Dated this ___ day of June, 2009.

FOREMAN

IfO~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife ; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC. , an Idaho Corporation,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT AND
RENEWED MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC. , an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT -1

I.

INTRODUCTION
The COUli should enter a directed verdict for the Defendants and grant their renewed motion
for summary judgment. As set forth below, the employment agreements are unenforceable as a
matter law. Specifically, these agreements do not contain the mandated legal descriptions as are
required under Idaho licensing statutes. Additionally, Defendants are entitled to a directed verdict
and judgment because the underlying real estate transaction never closed. Finally, the Court should
grant the instant motions as the term "forfeiture" has a settled legal meaning, requiring a breach of
contract before the provision can apply.
As a result, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for a directed verdict and renewed
motion for summary judgment.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
The applicable mle regarding motions for a directed verdict states as follows:
Motion for directed verdict - When made - Effect.

A paIiy who moves for a directed verdict at the close ofthe evidence
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the
motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do and
to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for
directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury
even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts.
A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds
therefor. The order of the COllli granting a motion for a directed
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
See I.R.C.P. 50(a).
With respect to the renewed motion for summary judgment, the standards for summary
judgment as contained in Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Specifically,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-2
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summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See LR.C.P. 56( c). Fm1her, the nonmoving must not rest upon mere allegations or demands, but must set f011h specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Doev.Durtschi, 110Idah0466,469, 716P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986).
Additionally, the non-moving party must come forward and produce evidence to contradict
assertions made by the moving pm1y. Olsen v. l.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d
1285,1299 (1990).
III.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Employment Agreements are Unenforceable as a Matter of Law.

The employment agreements do not meet the statutory requirements for brokerage
representation agreements under Idaho law. It is well established that real estate contracts are unique
in that they are heavily regulated by statute. See I.C § 54-2001, et. seq. As such, a valid broker's
representation agreement requires:
(a) Conspicuous and definite begim1ing and expiration dates; (b) a
legally enforceable description of the property; (c) price m1d tenl1s;
(d) all fees and commissions; and (e) the signature of the owner ofthe
real estate or the owner's legal, appointed and duly qualified
representative, and the date of such signature.

See I.C § 54-2050.
Significantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that this licensing statute applies to
private causes of action. See e.g., Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 437, 80 P.3d 1031, 1038
(2003).
In Garner, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a property address, stated "4565 Nounan Road,

County Bear Lake, City Nounan, Zip 83254" was not a "legally enforceable description of the
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-3
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property as required under Idaho Code § 54-2050(1)(b)." Id. at 436,80 P.3d at 1037. Additionally,
the Idaho Supreme Court held that this property description did not meet the requirements of the
statute of frauds under Idaho Code § 9-503. Id. The parties in Garner apparently understood what
property was being sold. Id. at 436,80 P.3d at 1037. Nevertheless, the pl'operty description in the
representation agreement contained only the home address and the approximate acreage being sold.
Id.
The Garner case is important in that it shows a representation agreement must meet the strict
requirements for an enforceable description ofthe propeliy. Fmiher, the need for a specific propeliy
description has recently been emphasized by the Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Ray v. Frazier,
146 Idaho 625,630,200 P.3d 1174, 1179 (2009) (holding that a physical address is a not a sufficient
description of the property for purposes ofthe statute of frauds).
In this matter, the employment contracts between Plaintiff and Defendants reference an
exhibit allegedly containing a legally enforceable property description. Neveliheless, this "exhibit
A" was not attached to the employment contracts at the time of execution.
As a matter oflaw, therefore, the employment contacts in this case are not valid as they lack
the statutory requirements as set forth in Idaho Code § 54-2050(1)(b) and Idaho Code § 9-503.
B.

Defendants are Entitled to a Directed Verdict and Judgment as a Broker Cannot
Recover Compensation Unless the Underlying Transaction Closes.

Plaintiffis not entitled to compensation in this matter as the underlying real estate transaction
never closed. It is well established that Idaho courts have adopted the rule as set f01ih in Ellsworth
DoM, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843,855 (N.J. 1967). See Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M.
And Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 213, 177 P.3d 955, 960 (2008); Blaine County Title
Associates v. One Hundred Building Corp., Inc., 138 Idaho 517, 521, 66 P .3d 221, 225 (2002);

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 257,846 P.2d 904, 908 (1993); see also Strout
Realty, Inc. v. Milhous, 107 Idaho 330, 334, 689 P.2d 222, 226 (Ct. App. 1984).

This rule requires that compensation only be paid where "the purchaser completes the
transaction by closing the title." Margaret H. Wayne Trust, 123 Idaho at 260, 846 P.2d at 911.
Further, the foregoing cases are significant as they show that parties cannot contract around the
requirement that brokers must close on a transaction before receiving compensation.
As the Idaho Supreme COUli recently explained:
Now, in addition to procuring a ready, willing and able buyer, the
buyer must enter into a binding contract with the owner and the buyer
must complete the transaction by closing title ....
Commercial Ventures, Inc., 145 Idaho at 213, 177 P.3d at 960 (citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust,

123 Idaho at 260, 846 P.2d at 911).
The facts in the case of Margaret H. Wayne Trust, are stIikingly similar to the facts in the
instant matter, thus creating a sufficient basis for a directed verdict and judgment for Defendants.
In Margaret H. Wayne Trust, the seller, Ms. Wayne, and the purchaser, Mr. Lipsky, entered into a
real estate purchase and sale agreement. A real estate broker, Mr. Reynolds, subsequently showed
the propeliy to Mr. Lipsky. See id. 145 Idaho at 257, 846 P.2d at 908. The sale of the property,
however, was never closed. See id. at 255,846 P.2d at 906. Significantly, the agreement between
the paIiies contained a clause regarding the forfeiture of nonrefundable money. The agreement stated
in pertinent part:
If ... buyer neglects or refuses to comply with the terms or any
conditions of sale within five days from the date on which said ten11
or condition is to be complied with, then the earnest money shall be
f07feited and considered as liquidated damages to seller, aI1d buyer's
interest in the premises shall be immediately ten11inated. The broker
shall pay fi-om said earnest money the cost of title insurance, escrow
fees, attorneys' fees and any other expenses directly inculTed in
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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connection with this transaction, and the remainder shall be apportioned one-halfto the seller and one-half to the broker, provided the
amount to broker does not exceed the commission.
Id. at 257,846 P.2d at 908 (emphasis added).

During a bench trial, the trial court granted payment for compensation owed to the broker,
Mr. Reynolds. In reversing the trial court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized:
Idaho has, in the past, adopted the traditional mle that a broker eams
his commission when he procures a buyer who is ready, willing and
able to purchase on terms acceptable to the seller. .. A growing
number of courts have, however, added a requirement that there must
be a closing oftitle for the broker to receive a commission, adopting
the rationale of Elsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236
A.2d 843 (1967): when a broker is engaged by any owner of property
to find a purchaser for it, the broker eams his commission when ...
( c) the purchaser completes the transaction by closing the title in
accordance with the provisions ofthe contract.
Id. at 259-60,846 P.2d 910-11 (emphasis added).

As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that because "the transaction between Lipsky and
Wayne never closed, Reynolds did not eam his commission." See id. at 260,846 P.2d at 911. The
COllli further held that as Wayne was a "non-breaching paIiy," she was not liable for any commission
to the broker, Mr. Reynolds. Id. Explicit in this decision is that the buyer and seller were not liable
for aIly compensation to the broker until the transaction closed.
Similarly, the parties in the case at bar have entered into an agreement regarding the broker's
compensation, which states in peliinent part:
Should a depositor amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited,
one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the broker, as the balance
shall be paid to me. The broker's share of any forfeited deposit or
amounts paid on account of purchase, shall not exceed the commisSIOn.

See Defendants' Exhibits "A" and "B".

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Thus, the contract provisions in the Margaret Wayne Trust case and the instant matter are
essentially the same. Both contracts contain forfeiture provisions regarding deposited monies and
a provision for distribution to the broker. Nevertheless, as the broker in Margaret Wayne Trust did
not receive any compensation, likewise Plaintiff in this matter cannot receive compensation as the
transaction did not close. See Margaret Wayne Trust, 145 Idaho at 260, 846 P.2d at 911.
C.

The Court Should Grant the Instant Motions as the Term "Forfeiture"Has a
Settled Legal Meaning.

The tenn "forfeited" is defined as a matter oflaw and requires a breach by the buyer in order
for it to become applicable. As set forth in another Idaho district comi case, Sauls v. Luchi, CV
2004-1616 (Dis. Ct. First Judicial Dist, Idaho June 17,2005):
The primary purposes of eal11est money is to ensure that the seller
will recover damages ifthe buyer defaults .... In the present case, the
buyer did not breach the contract, so even if the forfeiture clause is
valid regarding the eal11est money deposit, it is not applicable.
Thus, in Idaho there can be nor forfeiture of eal11est money unless the buyer first breaches
the purchase and sale agreement.
COUlis from other jurisdictions similarly have defined "forfeiture" as requiring a breach of
contract or neglect of duty. See People v. Blair, 831 N.E.2d 604, 615 (Ill. 2005)( defining forfeiture
as the loss of a privilege or property because of crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty);
Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corporation v. Grayson, 746 So.2d 121, 123-24 (La. App. 3rd
1999)( defining forfeiture as a surrender of something as a punishment for a crime, offense, enor, or
breach of contract); Baldwin v. Cook, 23 S.W.2d 601,604 (Ky. I 930)(stating that the word forfeit
has a well-established meaning, which is "to divest or to suffer divestiture of propeliy without
compensation in consequence of a default or offense"). Hence, a deposit or amount held in trust is
only "forfeited" upon a breach by the potential buyer.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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In this matter, there is no allegation by Plaintiff that the Harn10ns or MidAmerica committed
a breach. Therefore, there was no forfeiture entitling Plaintiff to its claim for the nonrefundable
momes.

IV.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for directed verdict
and renewed motion for summary judgment.
DATED this~ayofJune, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & C

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~y of June, 2009, I served a tme and correct copy
of the foregoing upon each of the followmg mdividuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
~;S.

Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 89-9040
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)
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CASE NO. CV-2008-6

FINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS'

INSTRUCTION NO.

q

If during the trial I said or did anything which suggests to you that I am inclined to favor
the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any such
suggestion. I did not express nor intend to express, nor did I intend to intimate, any opinion as to
which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not established; or what
inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine seemed to indicate an
opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

I~II

INSTRUCTION NO

(0

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is
respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO. _(,_
The terms ofthe contract are in dispute as to the following provisions:
Should a deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be
forfeited, one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the broker, and the
balance shall be paid to me. The broker's share of any forfeited deposit or
amounts paid on account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the
commission.

You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contract in this case. In
making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following:
1.

The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances giving

rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it.
2.

Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence

that a special meaning was intended.
3.

Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties showing

what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered, provided that
such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with the
remainder of the terms.
4.

The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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INSTRUCTION NO.

i 2-

You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any
witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement,
which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. While you may
consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarifY an ambiguity, you may not consider such
testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

J~

Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the true intent of the parties
cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the
contract against the party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

I 3A

If the language used by the parties to a contract is plain, complete, and unambiguous, the
intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone, no
matter what the actual or secret intentions of the parties may have been. The intent of the parties
to a contract is expressed by the natural and ordinary meaning of their language and the parties
are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly state.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

14

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

t'8

The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
1. A contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants;
2. The Defendants breached the contract;
3. The Plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions required
of the Plaintiff has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised
by the Defendants, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your consideration of all
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, your verdict should
be for the Defendants.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

Ito

The Defendants have raised the affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel. This is a legal
term which means that a party is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by reason of
the party's own conduct. To establish the affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel, the Defendants
have the burden of proof on each ofthe following propositions:
1.

The Plaintiff represented to the Defendants by words or conduct, or by silence when

a duty to speak and protest the action of the Defendants existed, that Plaintiff was waiving,
excusing, or forgiving those Defendants' breach of contract; and
2.

The Defendants relied upon this representation and materially changed position in

reliance thereon; and
3.

The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and

4.

The change of position was to the Defendants' detriment.

If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that the
Defendants are not liable to the Plaintiff for the claimed breach of contract. If the Defendants fail to
prove all of the propositions, they have not established the affirmative defense of estoppel.

JUR Y INSTRUCTIONS
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INSTRUCTION NO.

t1

Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct,
by words, or by acquiescence.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO. {

~

In their claim for conversion of money, Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson
Kennels, Inc. have the burden of proving each of the following propositions against John Knipe:
1. That John Knipe kept $22,500 without a right to do so;
2. The nature and extent of the damages to Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson
Kennels, Inc., and the amount thereof
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions ahs
been proved, then your verdict on this issue should be for the Robertsons and Robertsons Kennels,
Inc.; but, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions have
not been proved, then your verdict on this issue should be for Mr. Knipe.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

fl

The Plaintiff has raised the affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel against the
Defendants' counterclaim. This is a legal term which means that a party is deemed to have waived
a claimed breach of contract by reason of the party's own conduct. To establish the affirmative
defense of waiver by estoppel, the Counter-Defendants have the burden of proof on each of the
following propositions:
1.

The Defendants represented to Knipe Land Company and/or John Knipe by words

or conduct, or by silence when a duty to speak and protest the action of Knipe Land Company
and/or John Knipe existed, that Defendants were waiving, excusing, or forgiving those CounterDefendants' breach of contract; and
2.

The Counter-Defendants relied upon this representation and materially changed

position in reliance thereon; and
3.

The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and

4.

The change of position was to the Counter-Defendants' detriment.

If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that the
Counter-Defendants are not liable to the Defendants on their counterclaim.

If the Counter-

Defendants fail to prove all of the propositions, they have not established the affirmative defense of
estoppel.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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INSTRUCTION NO.

1f:J

Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. have the additional burden
of proving the following propositions on their claim that Knipe Land Company and John Knipe
violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act by:
1. Failing to deliver to Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, Inc. legible copies of the
Employment Contracts at the time Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, Inc.' s
signatures were obtained; and/or
2. Engaging in any act or practice which was otherwise misleading, false, or deceptive
to Robertsons and/or Robertson Kennels, Inc.
Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. also have the burden of
proving that as a result of the violation they were damaged, and the amount therof.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

;83/

INSTRUCTION

NO.zL

I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for your
deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the attitude
and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important.

At the outset of

deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of
pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is
wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me,
there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you
must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of
the case with your fellow jurors.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

~1,

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide
any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are
to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to
average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of
the damage award

~';..pm~~~~~~~rce:r

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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INSTRUCTION NO.

?~

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me
by any means other than such a note. Please use this process with restraint. As I previously
instructed you, the Court is unable to coach you as to the value or effect of the evidence or to the
weight you should attach to it. That is the duty of the jury alone. In addition, you are not to
reveal to me or anyone else how the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you
are instructed by me to do so.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION

No.l~

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over
your deliberations.

An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all ofthe questions required of you by the instructions on
the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine
or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you should fill
it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on each question.
If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who will
then return you into open court.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
)
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L.
)
)
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and
ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho
)
Corporation,
)
)
Defendants.
)

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L.
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and
ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third Party Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2008-682

VERDICT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
QUESTION 1: Did the Defendants breach the Employment Contracts they entered into
with Plaintiff?
ANSWER TO QUESTION 1:

VERDICT

YesW

NoLL

If you answered this question "No," then go to Question 4. If you answered this question
"Yes," continue to the next question.

QUESTION 2: Did the Defendants prove any of their affirmative defenses?
ANSWER TO QUESTION 2:

Yes~

No~

If you answered this question "No," then continue to the next question. If you answered
this question "Yes," then go to Question 4.

QUESTION 3: What are Plaintiff's damages?
ANSWER TO QUESTION 3:

Amount

QUESTION 4: Did John Knipe convert $22,500 belonging to the Robertsons and
Robertson Kennels, Inc. for his own use?

No~]

ANSWER TO QUESTION 4:

If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 6. If you answered this question
"Yes," continue to the next question.

QUESTION. 5: What are the damages ofMr. and Mrs. Robertson and Robertson
Kennels, Inc. with respect to this claim?

Amount $- - - - - - -

QUESTION 6. Did John Knipe violate the Idaho Consumer Protection Act?
ANSWER TO QUESTION 6:

YesLL.QJ

NoLL]

If you answered this question "no," you are done. Sign the Verdict as instructed and
advise the bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question.

VERDICT

QUESTION 7: What are the damages ofMr. and Mrs. Robertson and Robertson Kennels,
Inc. with respect to this claim?
Amount $

Dated this
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

**********
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER
COURT REPORTER: DENECE GRAHAM
DATE: June 25, 2009

Knipe Land Company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2008-00682*D

-vs-

COURT MINUTES
Time:8:29 A.M.- 6:43 P.M.
Courtroom #1

Richard A. Robertson and
Johnnie L. Robertson, and
Robertson Kennels Inc.,
Defendant.
Richard A. Robertson and
Johnnie L. Robertson, and
Robertson Kennels Inc.,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
-vs-

John Knipe,
Third Party Defendant.

This being the time and place set for third day of jury
trial, present before the Honorable Stephen W. Drescher were
John Knipe; plaintiff and third party defendant, Mark Geston
and Jennifer Rhinehart on behalf of the plaintiff,
Richard
Robertson;
defendant and third party plaintiff,
Robert
Wetherell and Derek Pica on behalf of the defendant.
The parties were present outside the presence of the jury.
Mr. Wetherell presented an offer of proof as to using a
dictionary.
Mr. Geston made an objection to the defendant's
motion.
The Court ordered the objection was sustained.
Mr.
Wetherell made further statements.
The jurors were present
courtroom at 8:36 a.m.

Court Minutes June 25, 2009

and

appropriately

seated

in

the

was reminded of his oath and returned to the
wi tness
stand.
Mr.
Wetherell
continued
with
cross
examination of the witness.
John

Knipe

Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court sustained the
objection. Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court sustained
the objection.
Mr. Geston made another objection, the Court
sustained the objection.
Mr. Geston presented redirect examination of the witness.
Mr. Wetherell made an objection based on leading,
sustained the objection.

the Court

The witness was excused at 8:54 a.m.
Mr. Geston offered Plaintiff exhibit 43; defendant Richard
and Johnnie Robertson's 2007 Tax Returns. Mr. Wetherell made
an objection based on lack of foundation.
The Court
sustained the objection.
The plaintiff rested.
Mr. Wetherell advised he had a motion to argue outside the
presence of the jury.
The Court ordered to reserve the
argument and call the defendant's first witness.
Mr. Wetherell called Richard Robertson; the defendant, who
was duly sworn by the clerk and testified under direct
examination of Mr. Wetherell.
Mr.

Wetherell presented previously marked Defendant exhibit
Harmon extension agreement dated February 15, 2006, and
moved for admission.
Mr. Geston had no objection. THE COURT
ORDERED DEFENDANT EXHIBIT 0 WAS ADMITTED.
0;

Mr. Wetherell presented previously marked Defendant exhibit
N; Rowena Strain facsimile stating Richard will extend
closing with non-refundable earnest money, and moved for
admission.
Mr. Geston had no obj ection. THE COURT ORDERED
DEFENDANT EXHIBIT N WAS ADMITTED.
Mr.
Geston made an objection,
the Court sustained the
objection. Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court overruled
the obj ection.
Mr. Geston made an obj ection, the Court
overruled the obj ection.
Mr. Geston made an objection, the

Court Minutes June 25, 2009
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Court sustained the objection. Mr. Geston made an objection,
the Court overruled the objection.
Mr. Geston made an
obj ection and presented argument, the Court admonished Mr.
Wetherell to not coach the witness.
Mr. Wetherell
witness.

continued

with

direct

examination

Mr. Geston made an obj ection based on relevance,
overruled the objection.

of

the

the Court

The jurors were reminded of their admonishment and the Court
recessed at 9:38 a.m.
The Court reconvened at 9:55 a.m. outside the presence of the
jury.
Mr. Wetherell presented motion for directed verdict and
renewed his motion for summary judgment.
The Court made
explanation to the parties and denied the motion.
Mr. Wetherell made inquiry to the Court regarding the Idaho
Consumer Protective Act.
Mr. Geston responded.
The Court
addressed counsel. Mr. Wetherell made further argument.
The Court noted for the record that prior to trial beginning
counsel stipulated to not have alternate jurors.
Mr. Geston presented argument regarding motion in limine
regarding testimony of Cindy Crain.
Mr. Wetherell presented
an offer of proof to the Court.
The Court made inquiry to
Mr. Wetherell. Mr. Wetherell responded. Mr. Geston replied.
The Court ordered the witness can testify but admonished
counsel as to her limited testimony.
The Court recessed at 10:14 a.m.
The Court recovened at 10:21 a.m., with counsel present and
the jurors were present and appropriately seated.
Richard Robertson was reminded of his oath and returned to
the witness stand. Mr. Geston conducted cross examination of
the witness.
Mr. Wetherell made an objection, the Court sustained the
objection.
Mr. Wetherell made an objection, the Court
overruled the obj ection.
Mr. Wetherell made an obj ection

Court Minutes June 25, 2009
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based on relevance, the Court overruled the objection.
Mr.
Pica made an objection, Mr. Geston responded, the Court
overruled the objection.
Mr. Geston presented previously marked Plaintiff exhibit 43;
defendants Richard and Johnnie Robertson's 2007 tax returns,
and moved to admit page one of the exhibit.
Mr. Wetherell
had a question in lieu of an objection, and objected to the
admission.
The Court overruled the objection.
Mr. Geston had the witness refer to page 11 of exhibit 43.
THE COURT
ADMITTED.

ORDERED

PAGE

11

OF

PLAINTIFF

EXHIBIT

43

WAS

Mr. Wetherell conducted redirect examination of the witness.
Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court allowed the question.
Mr. Geston made an objection,
the Court sustained the
objection.
Mr. Geston conducted re-cross examination of the witness.
Mr. Wetherell made an objection, Mr. Geston responded, and
the Court overruled the objection and advised the witness can
speak for himself.
The witness was excused at 11:05 a.m.
Mr.
Wetherell
called
Cindy
Crane;
representative
of
MidAmerican, who was duly sworn by the clerk and testified
under direct examination of Mr. Wetherell.
Mr. Geston
objection.

made

an

objection,

the

Court

sustained

the

Mr. Geston conducted cross examination of the witness.
Mr.
Geston moved to strike the evidence of the witness, the Court
overruled the objection.
Mr. Wetherell conducted redirect examination of the witness.
Mr. Geston made an objection based on beyond the scope, the
Court sustained the objection.
Mr. Geston made another
objection, the Court overruled the objection.
The witness was excused at 11:25 a.m.

Court Minutes June 25, 2009

The defense rested.
The State had no rebuttal evidence.
The Court reminded the
recessed at 11:27 a.m.
The Court reconvened
without the jurors.

at

jurors

of

their

1:33

p.m.

with

admonishment

counsel

and

present

In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Geston presented
argument for his obj ection to the jury instructions.
Mr.
Wetherell responded.
The
Court
noted
instructions.

the

plaintiff's

objections

to

the

In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Wetherell presented
argument in favor of the jury instructions.
The Court denied
the request to instruct the jury on punitive damages.
The Court amended the jury instructions
instruction 13A would be included.

and

advised

jury

Mr. Wetherell moved to amend the complaint and presented
argument.
Mr. Geston made an objection.
The Court sustained
the objection.
Mr. Geston made a motion regarding directed verdict.
Court denied the plaintiff's motion.

The

Mr. Wetherell inquired about procedure of closing argument.
The Court responded.
The Court recessed at 2:08 p.m.
The Court reconvened at 2:22 p.m.
present and appropriately seated.

with

counsel

and

jurors

The Court gave the jury instructions to the jury panel.
Mr. Geston presented closing argument.
Mr. Wetherell presented closing argument.
Mr. Geston made an objection based on Mr. Wetherell
citing statute, the Court sustained the objection.
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was
Mr.

Geston made another objection with the same basis, the Court
sustained the obj ection.
Mr. Geston made an obj ection, and
the Court admonished the jury to remember the facts of the
case as presented during trial not the closing argument. Mr.
Geston made an objection, the Court sustained the objection.
Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court allowed Mr. Wetherell
to continue.
Mr. Geston presented rebuttal closing argument.
The clerk swore in the bailiff.
The jury was
4:08 p.m.

excused to the

jury room for

deliberation at

The Court thanked counsel and recessed at 4:11 p.m.
The Court reconvened at 6:36 p.m.
and
the
jurors
were
present
appropriately seated.
In answer to the Court's
verdict had been reached.

inquiry

all parties were present
in
the
courtroom
and

the

jurors

indicated

a

Juror 587 presented the verdict form to the Court.
The Court reviewed the verdict form and advised it was in
order,
the clerk read the verdict form.
The foreman
concurred that the verdict was correct.
Mr. Wetherell waived polling the jury panel.
Mr. Geston requested the jurors be polled by the Court.
The Court made inquiry of each juror as to the verdict
reached.
Juror 3, 590, 592, 596, 542, 484, 13, 574, 506,
564, 587, and 571 concurred that the verdict was correct.
The Court read the final jury instruction to the jury panel,
thanked them for their service, and excused the jurors at
6:43 p.m.
The Court
judgment.

asked

Mr.

Wetherell

Court was adjourned.
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to

prepare

the

appropriate

STEPHEN W. DRESCHER
Betty

. Dressen, Clerk

BY:

Court Minutes June 25, 2009
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FILED
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Payetta ~unty, Idaho

Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346

JUN302009 P.M.

Email: msgeston@stoel.com
Jennifer M, Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com
STOEL RIVES r..r..p

_ _ _A.M.

&,TY J.
By

101 S Capitol Boulevard~ Suite 1900

DRE~N

~ r;;rA

[)€puty

Boise, In 83702
Telephone: (208) 389·9000
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF INTENT TO CONTACT
JURORS

v.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,

an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

v.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,

Third P

Defendant.

NOTICE OF INTENT TO CONTACT JURORS - 1
BOise·2217S9.10010908-0oo08
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COME NOW Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe, by
and through their counsel of record, and hereby submit notice of their intent to contact the
individual jUtors impaneled during the trial held June 23, 2009 through June 25,2009, in Payette
County, Idaho in the instant matter.
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant request immediate notification by counsel for
Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs of any objection to this intention to contact said jurors.

DATED: JWle~O, 2009.
STOEL RIVES LLP

Mark S. Gestol1
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF INTENT TO CONTACT JURORS - 2
6()isc-1211S9.1 0010908-00008

I Y4' 7

06/30/2009 10:03 FAX

~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on June 'g" ,2009, I served a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
INTENT TO CONTACT JURORS on the following, in the matter indicated below:
Derek A. Pica, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N Capito! Boulevard, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 336-4144
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980
Email: derekplca@mS12.com
Attorney for Defendants

[ ] Via U.s. Mail
[~ia Fac~imi1e

[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ ] Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Robert T. Wetherell
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P. O. Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077

[ ] Via U.S. Mail
[~ia

Facsimile

[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ ] Via Hand Delivery
[ ] ViaEmail

Email: rlw@brassey.net
Attorneys for Defendants

~kS. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF INTENT TO CONTACT JURORS .. 3
Boise-2217S9.1 0010908.00008
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FILED

THIRD JUDICIAL marRier COURT
Payette County, Idaho

·JUL

,

2009

06
_ _~.
A.M. _ _ _,P.M.
Mark S, Geston, ISB No. 1346
Email: msgeston@stoel.com
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com
STOEL RIVES LL?
101 S Capitol Boulevard. Suite 1900

BETIY J. DRESSEN
By ____
eN..::;.;·
:...::....._ _ , Deputy

Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 389-9000
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIlE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
KNIPE LAND COMPANY~ an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,

Case No. CV 2008-682

PLAINTIFF I THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANTS' / THIRD PARTY
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FORM OF
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

v.
JOHN ~NIPE, an individual,

Third P

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF / TIDRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' I
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT - 1
Boife-22Ia602001090B"()0009
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~
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COME NOW PlaintiffI<nipe Land Company' and Third Party Defendant John Knipe, by
and through their counsel of record and hereby object to the proposed form of Judgment
submitted by Defendants / Thlrd Party Plaintiffs on June 30, 2009.
The proposed form of Judgment is needlessly prolix, contains irrelevancies, and
improperly attempts to crea.te new claims fOt relief by Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs.
Specifically, the proposed form of Judgment recites the pleadings in its numbered
paragraphs 1,2 and 3, in violation of Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 54(a).
Secondly, the proposed fonn of Judament purportedly reserves "additional claims [by
Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs] under the equitable powers of the Court pursuant to
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act." There is no justification for the inclusion of such a provision
in the Judgment that the Court will enter in light of the jury's verdict. All of the claims
Defendants / Third Party Plaintiffs sought to bring under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act

have been fully litigated and the jury has conclusively determined that their sole relief they are
entitled to thereunder should be a verdict of$l,OOO against Third Party Defendant, John Knipe.
There are no "additional" claims left for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs to assert in
this case. Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs moved to amend their pleadings to conform to
the evidence after the parties bad rested at trial but that motion was denied by the Court.
This controversy has been fully resolved by the JUl")"S verdict. . There is therefore no
reason for any mention of a prospective declaration of fInality under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b).

PLAINTIFF I THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' I
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT - 2
Boise-221860.20010908-OO009

If60

~

STOEL RlVES LLP

ark S. Geston
JelUlifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff I Third Party Defendant

PLAINTIFF I THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' I
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT - 3
Boise-221860.20010908·00oo9
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifY on July

C, ,2009, I served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF I

mIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS I THIRD PARTY
PLAlNTlFFSt PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT on the following, in the matter
indicated below:

[ ] Via U.8. Mail

Derek A. Pica, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302
Boise,l.D 83702
Telephone: (208) 336-4144
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980

[t..:y\'ia Facsimile
[ ] Via OVernight Mail

[ ] Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Email;derekpica@msn.com
Attorney for Defendants
Robert T. Wetherell
BRASSEY, WETHERELL &
203 W. Main Street

[ ] Via U.S. Mail .

eRAWFORD, LLP

[t..{"Via Facsimile

[ J Via

P. O. Box 1009
Boise,ID 83701-1009

Overnight Mail

[ ] Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Email: rtw@brassey.net
Attorneys for Defendants

Mark S, Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF I THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' I
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT - 4
Boisc-221860.2001090S'()OOO9
5~
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COURT

Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,

-

Defendants.

0:::

o

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.

JUDGMENT -1

1<E53

This matter having come on regularly for jury trial and the jury having rendered its verdict
in this cause,
JUDGMENT is hereby entered upon the jury verdict as follows:

1.

PlaintiffKNlPE LAND COMPANY'S Complaint in this matter is dismissed, with
prejudice and Plaintiff KNIPE LAND COMPANY shall take nothing by way of its
Complaint.

2.

Third-Party Plaintiffs RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
complaint for conversion against JOHN KNIPE, an individual, is dismissed, with
prejudice and Third Party Plaintiffs RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L.
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation shall take nothing by way of their Complaint for conversion against
Third Party Defendant JOHN KNIPE, an individual.

3.

Third Party Plaintiffs RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIEL. ROBERTSON,
husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation
complaint against Third Party Defendant JOHN KNlPE, an individual, for violation
ofthe Idaho Consumer Protection Act is GRANTED and JUDGMENT for $1 ,000.00
is hereby entered in favor of RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L.
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation and against Third Party Defendant, JOHN KNIPE, an individual.

The Court took under advisement, until such time as nominal damages were awarded by the
Jury under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, additional claims under the equitable powers ofthis
Court pursuant to Idaho's Consumer Protection Act.

JUDGMENT -2

I fs4

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that any additional claims forre1ief
under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, made by RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L.
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, shall
be filed with this Court within 14 days of the entry by the Clerk of this Order.
By way of this JUDGMENT, the Court specifically retains jurisdiction over the equitable
remedies, if any, which may be requested by RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNN1E L.
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
pursuant to Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, I.C. 48-6501 et seq.
This JUDGMENT is specifically entered pursuant to lRCP 54(b) and no 54(b) Certificate is
entered and no party may consider this JUDGMENT as a FINAL JUDGMENT until a Rule 54(b)
Certified Judgment is

e,~.I.JVU

DATED this

HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of furre;'2009, I served a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

u.s. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

Robert T. Wetherell
Brassey, Wetherell, & Crawford
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009

u.s. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand -Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 344-7077

Clerk

JUDGMENT -4

ORIGINAL
JUL 1 5
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,

vs.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,

DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTY
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES

Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.

DEFENDANTSITIIIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 1

COME NOW, DefendantslThird-Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") by and through
their counsel of record, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and respectfully move the Court for an
Order awarding costs and attorneys fees incurred in this matter. This motion is brought pursuant to
Idaho statute, including, but not limited to, I.e. §§ 12-120(3),48-608(5), and 12-121, as well as Rule
54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
This motion is supported by Defendants' Memorandum In Support and the Affidavits of
Robert T. Wetherell and Derek Pica, filed contemporaneously herewith, and is further supported by
the papers and pleadings of record.
Defendants reserve the right to supplement this motion with a request for additional costs and
attorneys fees pending the resolution of the post-trial motions and activities in this matter.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this

~ay of July, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAlNTlFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 2

/ 'S5~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;t5day of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

~

Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

DEFENDANTS/TIDRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 3
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ORIGINAL
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,

AFFIDA VIT OF ROBERT T.
WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES

Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 1
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STATEOFIDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)

ROBERT T. WETHERELL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That your Affiant is over the age of 21, and is competent to make this Affidavit and

does so based upon his own direct and personal knowledge.
2.

That your Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for Defendants/Third-Party

Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") and offers the following testimony based upon his knowledge
and upon the accounts, records and ledgers kept by your Affiant's law fum in the ordinary course
of business. Further, this Affidavit is made pursuant to Rules 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3.

That the costs and fees are claimed in compliance with Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, that your Affiant believes an award of costs and attorneys fees to
the Defendants is proper and appropriate in this case on the grounds and for the reasons that
Defendants are the prevailing party in this action pursuant to I.e. §§ 12-120(3),48-608(5), 12-121
and Rule 54(d) and (e). Specifically, Defendants successfully defended against Plaintiff s claims for
$220,000, and prevailed upon Defendants' own claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
4.

That to the best of your Affiant's knowledge and belief, all the costs, disbursements

and attorneys fees listed below and in any way associated with Defendants' Motion for Costs and
Attorneys Fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred in litigating this matter in good faith, and
that none ofthe costs and attorneys fees were incurred to vex, harass or annoy Plaintiff. Further, the
costs and attorneys' fees were not incurred for the pUrposes of increasing the Plaintiff s costs and

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
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attorneys fees in this matter. The costs and attorneys' fees set out below are true and accurate, and
are presented to the Court in compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy ofyour Affiant's finn's

statement of account for this matter, as created in the normal and ordinary course of business. This
statement reflects the legal services and costs perfonned or incurred by our firm on behalf of
Defendants.
6.

The following is a summary ofthe costs and attorneys fees incurred by our finn on

behalf of Defendants:

A.

COSTS ALLOWED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)
•

Filing fees: (See Affidavit of Derek Pica)

•

Costs of exhibits: [as a matter of right, capped at $500, remainder is

discretionary]
-6/21109: Copying of exhibits 657 @ 0.15 = $98.55
-6/22/09: Easel and pad $31.79
-6/22/09: Copying of exhibits 570 @ 0.15 = $85.50
-6/22/09: Copying 12 sets of221 jury exhibits 2652 @ 0.15 = $397.80

•

Deposition transcripts and/or copies: (See Affidavit of Derek Pica)

Total Costs as a Matter of Right (by fmn on behalf of Defendants): $500.00

B.

DISCRETIONARY COSTS ALLOWED UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D)
•

Cost of exhibits (residual amount): $113.64
Round-trip Travel to Payette for trial:
-3 days (June 23,24, and 25,2009) for Robert Wetherell
165 x 3 = 495 miles @0.50 = $247.50

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTSITHIRD-P ARTY PLAINTIFFS'
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-6-24-09 for Brad Richardson 120 @0.55 = $66.00
-6-25-09 for Brad Richardson 105 @0.55 = $57.75
•

Additional Travel expenses: meals during trial as submitted by
Robert Wetherell = $128.90

Total discretionary costs claimed: $613.79
C.

ATTORNEY FEES
Attorneys fees incurred by my firm on behalfofDefendants amount to $35,915.00.

TOTAL COSTS & FEES CLAIMED: $ 37,038.54
7.

The attorneys fees in the amount of $35,915.00 incurred by my firm were incurred

in defending this matter and in pursuing the claims of the Defendants. The work on this case by my
firm was performed primarily by me, my associate Bradley S. Richardson, and my paralegal Lorinda
Tuttle.
8.

My rate for trial work in contested real estate cases such as the present one is $250.00

per hour. My associate bills $200.00 an hour for these matters, and my paralegal bills at $140.00 per
hour.
9.

Time records were kept by entering the time into a computer from which the billing

statements were generated. Exhibit "A" identifies the attorney or paralegal who performed the
service, sets forth the date the service was performed, provides a description ofthe services rendered,
itemizes the amount of time needed to perform the service, sets forth the hourly rate charged for the
service, and computes the fee charged for the service. These charges are consistent with the fees
charged by other attorneys in this area oflaw with comparable experience and skill.
10.

Your Affiant has reviewed the provisions ofRule 54(e)(3) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure, which provides a list of criteria to be utilized by the Court in determining reasonable

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
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attorneys fees. In evaluating the reasonableness ofthe fees charged herein, your Affiant would advise
the Court as follows:
(a)

Time and Labor Involved: My finn keeps track ofthe time spent on cases

by each individual attorney and/or paralegal. In addition, I have not submitted a request for time
spent by my legal assistant who provided significant paralegal work in getting this matter ready for
trial. I have reviewed the billing sheets generated from this case and believe the time and labor
reported were reasonably and necessarily incurred to provide a proper defense and representation in
this matter.
(b)

Novelty and Difficulty: While I would not classify this case as particularly

novel or difficult to the extent it involves a broker's claim for commission, I do believe the case
became more complex in that it invoked several licensing laws and consumer issues that added a
greater degree of difficulty and novelty to the case. That being said, we worked to keep the case
focused on its major issues in order to streamline the time, costs and fees incurred.
(c)

Skill, Experience and Ability: I acted as the lead attorney in this matter. I

am an AIV rated attorney and have been practicing for more than 25 years almost exclusively in the
area of civil litigation, including numerous jury trials. I feel I am qualified to act as trial counsel in
civil litigation matters based upon my background and experience.
Bradley S. Richardson joined our firm in July of 2006. Prior to that time, Mr.
Richardson worked for another large law finn in the Boise area. Mr. Richardson graduated from the
University of Idaho College of Law. During law school, Mr. Richardson was an e:xtern for the
Honorable Judges Larry Boyle and Carl Kerrick. During the time he has been with our finn, Mr.
Richardson has worked on many of my cases and has been responsible for many pre-trial matters and

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
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trial support. I believe Mr. Richardson is qualified to act as counsel in these matters based upon his
background, experience and ability.
Lorinda Tuttle is a very experienced and capable paralegal with many years of
experience. Ms. Tuttle is efficient and competent in providing legal services, and in providing trial
support. Ms. Tuttle works on many of my cases and she is qualified to assist me in most civil
litigation matters based upon her background and experience.
(d)

Prevailing Charges: The rates charged in this case are standard, customary

and comparable to other amounts charged for trial work for private clients. This particularly is true
given the time limitations and deadlines in our firm's preparation for trial in this matter. As such,
I believe that our charges in this case are consistent with, or lower than, the fees charged by other
attorneys in the area with comparable experience. In doing so, I would note the recent Supreme
Court case of Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772,203 P 3d 702 (2009). In that case, the Idaho Supreme
Court recognized the District Court's finding in another real estate case that trial work in the Boise
area ranges from $250.00 an hour to $400.00 an hour. See ill. at 777, 203 P.3d at 707.
( e)

Fee: The fee arrangement among Defendants, Mr. Pica, and our law firm

provides for hourly billings consistent with the rates set forth in Exhibit "A."

(f)

Time Limitations: As set forth above, we were brought into this case in order

to fmalize preparation for trial and to take the lead in the trial proceedings. That being said, our time
and preparation, in my opinion, was relativelyrninimal based upon my experience in numerous other
commercial litigation trials. Further, much of the research, briefing, fact finding, discovery and
negotiations had already taken place prior to my finn's involvement.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
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(g)

Amount Involved & Results Obtained: In its Complaint, Plaintiff demanded

$17,500 under the 2005 employment contract and $202,500 under the 2007 employment contract
for a total of $220,000. Defendants offered to settle the case for $75,000 in new money, plus allow
Plaintiff to keep $22,500 already in its possession. Plaintiff subsequently demanded $275,000 to
resolve the matter. A $200,000 offer to settle was communicated the day before trial. At trial,
Defendants received a complete defense verdict on these claims and Plaintiff was awarded nothing.
Defendants also were awarded the nominal amount requested of $1,000 on their claim under the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Defendants did not recover on their claim for conversion.
(h)

Undesirability of Case: Idonotknowofanyundesirablefeatureofthecase.

(i)

Professional Relationship: I did not have any relationship with the

Defendants prior to this lawsuit, but have had an ongoing professional relationship with counsel
Derek Pica.
(j)

Award in Similar Cases: Awards in similar disputes vary widely depending

upon the terms of the particular contracts and the broker's track record and interaction with
consumers.
(k)

Computer-Assisted Research: Our firm utilizes, and did utilize in this case,

computer-assisted research. The cost ofcomputer research is not inexpensi ve, but we often view this
cost as a part of doing business and did not pass this cost on to the client. As such, we have not
requested reimbursement for this cost. I believe computer assisted research is appropriate to
maximize an attorney's time and minimize the fees charged to the client.
(1)

Other Factors: I know of no other factors.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
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11.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants claim a total of$l, 123.54 in costs and $35,915

in attorneys fees for the costs and services rendered by my fum. These fees and costs are separate,
distinct and in addition to those incurred by co-counsel Derek Pica on behalf ofDefendants. Ibelieve
the amounts to be reasonably and necessarily incurred in this caSe by my firm. It would be in the
best interest of justice to award these attorney fees and costs.
12.

Your Affiant reserves the right to supplement this affidavit with additional costs and

fees pending the resolution of the post-trial motions.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

Dated this R d a y of July, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETHERELL &

orneys for DefendantsfThird Party Plaintiffs

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .,ffiay of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
/,/-

V

Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

,,8

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040
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LAW OFFICE

BRASSEY, WETHERELL, eRAWFORD & GARRETT, LLP
Tax LD. # 84-1370958

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT

June 29,2009
File #:
Invoice #:

Derek Pica
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 302
Boise, ID 83702

3035-001
16460

FEES & COSTS THROUGH:

June 26, 2009
RE:

Knipe v. Robertson et al.

PAYMENTS THROUGH:

June 29, 2009

$ 0.00

PREVIOUS BALANCE:
LESS PAYMENTS APPLIED SINCE LAST
BILLING:

$ 0.00

BALANCE FORWARD:
TOTAL FEES FOR THIS BILL:
TOTAL COSTS FOR THIS BILL:

$ 0.00

$35,915.00
$1,123.54

TOTAL DUE FOR THIS BILL:

$ 37,038.54

Less retainer applied to this invoice:

$ 10,000.00

NEW BALANCE:

$ 27,038.54

ITEMIZA TlON OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AND COSTS ATTACHED

203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300

EXHIBIT

Ib

A
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Page
2
Invoice #:
16460
File#:
3035-001

June 29, 2009

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
DATE
6/19/09

6/20/09

DESCRIPTION

HOURS

RATE

AMOUNT

RTW Conference with Client (1.2); begin
review of pleadings and Motion for
Summary Judgment (5.7).

6.90

$250.00

1,725.00

BSR Legal analysis and evaluation of
Trial Brief reo facts of case and
associated legal issues.

1.60

$200.00

320.00

LKT Research all network locations re: all
individuals on the jury panel.
RTW Review research and case law from
research file (3.4); conference with
Client and review Jury List and
direct additional research (1.1 );
conference with counsel to develop
trial theme (3.3); continued review of
Pleadings and begin review of
exhibits (5.8); review proposed Jury
Instructions and note additions (2.2).
BSR Legal analysis and evaluation of
files, pleadings, exhibits (2.8);
research and legal analysis of Idaho
case authorities reo Ellsworth Dobbs
Rule and reo voiding commission
were no closing on transaction (1 .7).
LKT Continued research into all network
locations re: all individuals on the
jury panel.

4.50

$140.00

630.00

15.80

$250.00

3,950.00

4.50

$200.00

900.00

8.20

$140.00

1,148.00

6/21/09

RTW Review depositions and continued
review of exhibits in preparation for
trial.

11.00

$250.00

2,750.00

6/22/09

RTW Continued preparation for trial and
meet with Client, including testimony
preparation and review of Jury
Panel.

15.40

$250.00

3,850.00

BSR Continued analysis and evaluation
of pleadings, exhibits, agreements,
motions and submissions reo facts of
case and evaluate electronic use of
exhibits at trial.
BSR Research and legal analysis of
cases from other jurisdictions reo
Ellsworth Dobbs Doctrine and reo

2.40

$200.00

480.00

4.50

$200.00

900.00

BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300
Tax LD. # 84-1370958
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Invoice #:
16460
File#:
3035-001

June 29, 2009

voiding commissions based upon
lack of closing on transaction (2.9);
research and analysis of realtor
codes of ethics, licenses statutes,
and statutory trust fund
requirements and their use at trial
(1.6).

6/23/09

6/24/09

BSR Meeting with Clients to review facts
of case and prepare for testimony of
Clients and review potential jurors.

2.00

$200.00

400.00

BSR Analysis of jury instructions and
prepare supplemental instructions
and verdict form.

1.60

$200.00

320.00

LKT Continued research into all network
locations re: all individuals on the
jury panel (7.5); preparation of
exhibits for use at trial (1.3).

8.80

$140.00

1,232.00

RTW Travel to Payette, attend trial, return
travel to Boise, and prepare for next
day of trial.

16.00

$250.00

4,000.00

BSR Research, analysis, and evaluation
of secondary resource materials reo
impeachment evidence against
Knipe Land Company and its
president, John Knipe.
BSR Legal analysis and evaluation of
summary judgment briefing, trial
briefs, punitive damage motions and
other filings in preparation to draft
motion motion for directed verdict
(1.9); preparation of motion for
directed verdict and renewed motion
for summary judgment, including
preparation of sections reo legal
standards, regulatory requirements,
need for closing, and forfeiture (5.5).

2.20

$200.00

440.00

7.40

$200.00

1,480.00

RTW Travel to Payette, attend trial, return
travel to Boise, and prepare for 2nd
day of trial, including outline of
closing.

18.00

$250.00

4,500.00

2.10

$200.00

420.00

BSR Research and legal analysis of
Idaho appellate authority reo
requirements for property
descriptions and reo use of tax

BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300
Tax I.D. # 84-1370958
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Invoice #:
16460
3035-001
File #:

June 29, 2009

BSR

BSR

6/25/09

RTW

6/26/09

RTW

BSR

notices as descriptions in broker
representation agreements.
Research and legal analysis reo
reduction of comission for breach of
fiduciary duty, punitive damages
under consumer act, on breach of
fair dealing in preparation to draft
additional jury instructions (.9);
continued preparation of
supplemental jury instructions and
proposed verdict form (.5).
Travel to trial to provide
impeachment evidence reo John
Knipe and trial support reo
impeachment of Plaintiffs real
estate agent.
Travel to Payette, attend trial, take
verdict and return travel to Boise.
Review Idaho Consumer Protection
Act for remedies and effect of
Judgment and Rules on Request for
Additur and additional relief,
including punitive damages.
Legal analysis and evaluation of
requirements for submission of fees
and costs as a matter of right and
discretionary costs (.3); legal
analysis and evaluation of attorney's
fees under Idaho Consumer
Protection Act (.6).

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

1.40

$200.00

280.00

3.80

$200.00

760.00

16.20

$250.00

4,050.00

4.80

$250.00

1,200.00

0.90

$200.00

180.00

160.00

BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300
Tax I.D. # 84-1370958
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$35,915.00
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16460
Invoice #:
3035-001
File #:

June 29,2009

TIMEKEEPER SUMMARY
TIMEKEEPER

TOTAL

HOURS

RATE

Robert T. Wetherell

104.10

$250.00

$26,025.00

Bradley S. Richardson

34.40

$200.00

$6,880.00

Lorinda K. Tuttle

21.50

$140.00

$3,010.00

COSTS - thru June 26,2009
Amount

Description

Payee (if applicable)

6/21/09

Copying - exhibits 657 @ 0.15

Expense Recovery

98.55

6/22109

Easel and pad

Office Depot

31.79

Copying - exhibits 570 @ 0.15

Expense Recovery

85.50

Copying - 12 sets of 221
(exhibits) 2652 @ 0.15

Expense Recovery

397.80

6/23/09

Internet research re: jury panel

Lorinda K. Tuttle

9.75

6/26/09

Travel to Payette for trial
Brad Richardson
6-25-09 105 @ 0.55 105 @ 0.55

57.75

Travel to Payette for trial
6-24-09120 @ 0.55

Brad Richardson

66.00

Travel expenses during trialround-trip from Boise to Payette
3 days (165 x 3 = 495 miles)
June 23, 24 and 25, 2009 - 495
miles @ $.50/mile

Robert T. Wetherell

BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300
Tax I.D. # 84-1370958
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16460
Invoice #:
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3035-001

June 29,2009

Travel expenses during trial meals during trial
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COME NOW, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") by and through
their counsel ofrecord, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and provides this Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as follows:

I.
INTRODUCTION
The Court should grant Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Attorneys
Fees. This Memorandum will show that Plaintiff demanded $275,000 and essentially forced this
matter to trial. hnmediately before trial, an offer to settle for $200,000 was made. More specifically,
this Memorandum will show that: (1) this case involves a commercial transaction and therefore fees
are to be given to the prevailing party; (2) Defendants are the prevailing party under I.C. § 12-120;
(3) Defendants are entitled to fees and costs under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and (4)
Defendants are entitled to costs under Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedu.re.

II.

PERTINENT FACTS AND BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2008, PlaintiIDThird Party Defendants (herinafter "Plaintiff') filed a Complaint
demanding $17,500.00 under the 1005 employment contract and $202,500.00 under the 2007
Employment Contract, in addition to the $22,500 Plaintiff had already wrongfully retained. See ~
3-4 of Complaint. The Complaint also sought attorneys fees and costs incurred relating to this
commercial transaction under I.C. § 12-120, as well as pre-judgment interest. See p. 6 of Complaint.
On July 17, 2008, DefendantslThird Party Plaintiffs' (herinafter "Defendants") filed their
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Answer and Third-Party Complaint. This pleading denied Plaintiff's assertion to the claimed monies
and asserted their own claims for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Additionally,
Defendants requested a return of monies held by Plaintiff in the amount of $22,500.00. In their
pleadings, Defendants also sought recovery oftheir attorneys fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120 and the
.Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
A few months before trial, Defendants offered $75,000.00 in new money to resolve this case,
and would allow Plaintiffto retain the $22,500.00 already held in its possession. See p. 6 ofAffidavit
of Derek Pica in Support ofDefendants/Third Party Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees
(hereinafter "Aff. of Pica"). This was done in an effort to resolve the matter without the time,
expense and fees associated with trial. See id. Plaintiff refused to accept Defendants' settlement
offer and demanded an amount more than contained in its original Complaint. See id. In fact, this
demand increased the amount being sought by Plaintiff from $220,000.00, as originally set forth in
the Complaint, to $275,000.00. See Exhibit "B" of Aff. of Pica. Thus, Plaintiff forced this case to
proceed to trial. See id.
On June 19, 2009, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford appeared in this matter to handle the lead
in trial and to provide the necessary trial support for the case. See p. 5 of Aff. of Pica. This
association between Mr. Pica and the firm ofBrassey, Wetherell & Crawford, was needed as Mr.
Pica is a sole practitioner, and as Plaintiff often has more than one attorney attending hearings and
providing pre-trial support. See id. As a result, this association was reasonable and necessary in this
matter. See id.
At trial, Plaintiff sought $220,000.00 under the 2005 and 2007 employment contracts. In
contrast, Defendants asked the jury for nominal damages of $1 ,000.00 under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act and for the return of monies for their conversion claim in the amount of$22,500.00.
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The jury rendered its verdict in this matter in favor of Defendants, specifically finding that
Defendants did not breach the employment contracts. See Ans. to Question 1 of V erdict Fonn. Thus,
the jury found Plaintiff was not entitled to any money. See Ans. to Question 3 of Verdict Fonn. In
addition, the jury found that Plaintiff violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and awarded
Defendants the requested nominal damages in the amount of$1 ,000.00. See Ans. to Questions 6 and
7 of Verdict Form. The jury also found that Plaintiff did not convert the deposited money of
$22,500.00 for his own use. See Ans. to Question 4 of Verdict Fonn.
Defendants now bring this Motion to recover their costs and attorneys fees.

III.
ARGUMENT
A.

Defendants are Entitled to Attorneys Fees as This Matter Involves a Commercial Transaction.

Defendants are entitled to attorneys fees under I.e. § 12-120 as this case centers on two
commercial employment contracts. The pertinent statutory provision regarding this issue provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument guaranty, or contract relating to the
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the
prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fees to be set
by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.

See I.C. § 12-120(3)(emphasis added).
Thus, it is well established that this statute mandates an award of attorneys fees to the
prevailing party in actions involving commercial transactions. See Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho
903,915,204, P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009) (citation omitted); Dennettv. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 31, 936
P.2d 219, 229 (1997).

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-P ARTY PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEYSFEES-4

1~78

The test for application of this statute is whether the commercial transaction comprises the
"gravamen" of the lawsuit. See Dennett, 130 Idaho at 31,936 P.2d at 229. This means the statute
applies where the "commercial transaction is integral to the claim," and constitutes the basis upon
which a party is attempting to recover. Id. (citations omitted).
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that this matter centers on a commercial transaction.

As the Court is aware, this action deals primarily with two employment contracts entered into by the
parties, one in 2005 and the other in 2007. Moreover, Plaintiff has effectively stipulated that
attorneys fees are appropriate under I.C. § 12-120, as it has plead them it its Complaint. See p. 6
of Complaint. As a result, I.C. § 12-120(3) applies to this case.
B.

Defendants are the Prevailing Party under I.C. § 12-120 and Therefore are
Entitled to Attorneys Fees.

Defendants are the prevailing party in this matter as they successfully defended against both
of Plaintiff's claims and proved that Plaintiff violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. The
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure defines "prevailing party," providing in part:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties.

See Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 777, 203 P.3d 702, 707 (2009) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).
As such, the prevailing party question is examined from an "overall view," not a claim-byclaim analysis. See Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (citing Eighteen

Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating and Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133
(2005». Significantly, a Defendants' non-liability is evidence that it is the prevailing party. Id.
In Shore, a district court found after a bench trial, that an accord and satisfaction had

discharged the defendant's liability on a note. See id. at 905, 204 P.3d at 1116. However, the
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defendant did not recover on his defense claim of conversion. Id. at 914, 204 P.3d at 1125.
Therefore, the trial court subsequently denied the defendant's request for costs and attorneys fees.

Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred in holding that
defendant was not the prevailing party. Id. at 915,204 P.3d at 1126. The Court recognized prior
case authority, emphasizing that "a defendant's non-liability is evidence that it is the prevailing
party." Id.
In Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating and Paving, Inc., 141, Idaho 716, 117

P.3d 130 (2005), the Court also found reversible error where the trial court determined that "although
the Defendants had successfully defended against the Plaintiff's complaint because they recovered
only a small portion of what they desired on their counterclaim, they were not prevailing parties."
See Shore. at 914, 204 p.3d at 1125.
The holding by the Court in Eighteen Mile regarding this issue states:
Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating was
a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court focused too
much attention on the Company's less than tremendous success on its
counterclaim and seemingly ignored the fact that the Company
avoided all liability as a defendant. The district court improperly
undervalued the Company's successful defense. Avoiding liability is
a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk
is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In
litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a
money judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with
a large money judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who
simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not
ignore the value of a successful defense. ill this case, logic suggests
that a verdict in Nord Excavating's favor and a victory on its
counterclaim (albeit. a relatively small one), by definition, makes it
a prevailing party.
See Eighteen Mile, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133 (emphasis added.)
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As was the case in Shore and Eighteen Mile, the primary issue in this matter has been
Plaintiff's claim to recover $220,000.00 under the two employment contracts. As the Court is well
aware, this was the subject matter of the vast majority of all briefing, discovery, and the trial
proceedings. As such, the fact that Defendants successfully defended against these claims and
Plaintiff received nothing, shows Defendants are the prevailing party. See ShOJ'e, 146 Idaho at 914,
204 P.3d at 1125. Moreover, Defendants prevailed on their own claim for nominal damages under
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, Defendants are the prevailing parties, even if they
did not recover fully on their Third-party Complaint. See id. (discussing Eighteen Mile, 141 Idaho
at 719, 117 P.3d 133).
The settlement demand by Plaintiff provides an additional basis showing that Defendants
prevailed in this matter. It is well established that the trial court may consider the difference between
a plaintiff s demand and a plaintiff s ultimate recovery in determining the prevailing party. Lake v.

Purnell, 143 Idaho 818, 821,153 P.3d 1164, 1167 (2007)(citingEighteenMile, 141 Idaho 716,117
P.3d 130).
The facts in this case show that a few months before trial, Defendants offered $75,000.00 in
new money to resolve this case, and would allow Plaintiff to retain the $22,500.00 already held in
its possession. See p. 6 Aff. of Pica. This was done in an effort to resolve the matter without the
time, expense and fees associated with trial. See id. Plaintiff refused to accept Defendants'
settlement offer, and demanded an amount more than contained in its original Complaint. See id.
In fact, this demand increased the amount being sought by Plaintiff from $220,000.00, as originally
set forth in the Complaint, to $275,000.00. See Exhibit "B" of Aff. of Pica. Thus, Plaintiff forced
this case to proceed to trial. See id.
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As a result, the fact that Plaintiffrecovered nothing on the most significant claims in this case
shows that Defendants are the prevailing party.

C.

Defendants' are Entitled to Attorneys Fees and Costs Under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act.

Defendants prevailed on their claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and are
therefore entitled to costs and attorneys fees. Relevant statutory provision regarding this issue states:
(5) Costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs. In any action brought by a person under this
section, the court shall award, in addition to the relief provided in this
section, reasonable attorneys fees to the plaintiff if he prevails. the
court in its discretion may award attorneys fees to a prevailing
defendant if it finds that the plaintiff s action is spurious or brought
for harassment purposes only.

See I.C. § 48-608(5)(emphasis added).
A review ofIdaho case authorities shows that the determination of attorneys fees under the
Act is made through the application ofthe prevailing party analysis, as set forth in the prior section.

See Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 124,27, 72 P.3d 864,867 (2003)(citing Nalen v. Jenkins, 113
Idaho 79,81,741 P.2d366, 368 (Ct. App. 1987)); see also Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411,
659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983)).
Defendants prevailed on their claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. In fact,
Defendants received the exact amount they requested at trial as nominal damages. As a result,
Defendants are the prevailing party under the Act, and therefore are entitled to attorneys fees and
costs.
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Defendants are Entitled to an Award of Costs as a Matter of Right Under Rule
54( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants are entitled to costs as a matter of right in the amount of$1,876.58 pursuant to
I.R.C.P.54(d)(1)(C). An accounting ofthese claimed costs are set forth in the Affidavits of Robert
T. Wetherell and Derek Pica, filed contemporaneously herewith. These costs were reasonably and

necessarily incurred to defend this action. Therefore, as the prevailing party, Defendants are entitled
to these costs as a matter of right.
E.

The Court Should Grant Discretionary Costs to Defendants Pursuant to Rule
54( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

°

Defendants also request an award of discretionary costs in the amount of$l ,647. 1 pursuant
to I.R.c.P. 54(d)(1)(D). An accounting of these claimed discretionary costs are set forth in the
Affidavits of Robert T. Wetherell and Derek Pica, filed contemporaneously herewith. The requests
costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred to defend this action. Additionally, it should be noted
that Defendants are not seeking all the travel costs associated with the various motions and discovery
in this matter, as well as computerized legal research that is typically granted as a matter of right.
As a result, the Defendants as the prevailing party in this matter respectfully request an award of
these claimed discretionary costs.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant the instant Motion and award Defendants
attorneys fees in the amount of$110,307.50 and costs in the amount of$3,533.34.
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DATED this /3day of July, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

~~.

Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040
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STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)

DEREK PICA, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That your Affiant is over the age of 21, and is competent to make this Affidavit and

does so based upon his own direct and personal knowledge.
2.

That your Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for Defendants/Third-Party

Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") and offers the following testimony based upon his knowledge
and upon the accounts, records and ledgers kept by your Affiant's law firm in the ordinary course
of business. Further, this Affidavit is made pursuant to Rules 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3.

That the costs and fees are claimed in compliance with Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, that your Affiant believes an award of costs and attorneys fees to
the Defendants is proper and appropriate in this case on the grounds and for the reasons that
Defendants are the prevailing party in this action pursuant to I.e. §§ 12-120(3),48-608(5), 12-121
and Rule 54(d) and (e). Specifically, Defendants successfully defended against Plaintiff s claims for
$220,000, and prevailed upon Defendants' own claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
4.

That to the best of your Affiant's knowledge and belief, all the costs, disbursements

and attorneys fees listed below and in any way associated with Defendants' Motion for Costs and
Attorneys Fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred in litigating this matter in good faith, and
that none ofthe costs and attorneys fees were incurred to vex, harass or annoy Plaintiff. Further, the
costs and attorneys' fees were not incurred for the purposes of increasing the Plaintiff s costs and
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attomeys fees in this matter. Your Affiant has review the costs and attomeys' fees set out below and
in the corresponding Affidavit of co-counsel Robert Wetherell. I hereby attest that the items and
accountings therein are true and accurate, and are presented to the Court in compliance with the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of your Affiant's firm's

statement of account for this matter, as created in the normal and ordinary course of business. This
statement reflects the legal services and costs performed or incurred byrne on behalf of Defendants.
6.

The following is a summary ofthe costs and attomeys fees incurred by me on behalf

of Defendants:

A.

COSTS ALLOWED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C)
Filing fees: $71.00
•

Deposition transcripts and copying thereof:
-M&M Court Reporting (deposition of Richard Robertson): $324.58
-Burnham Habel (depositions of John Knipe & Rowena Strain): $981.00

Total Costs as a Matter of Right (by me on behalf of Defendants): $1,376.58
B.

DISCRETIONARY COSTS ALLOWED UNDER I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(D)
•

Mediation (ElamBurke): $547.10

•

Postage: $120.12

•

Copies (2,440 @ 0.15): $366.00

Total discretionary costs claimed: $1,033.22
C.

ATTORNEY FEES
Attorneys fees incurred by me on behalf of Defendants amount to $74,392.50
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TOTAL COSTS & FEES CLAIMED: $ 76,802.30

7.

The attorneys fees in the amount of $74,392.50 incurred by me were incurred in

defending this matter and in pursuing the claims ofthe Defendants. This included most of the legal
research, fact finding, formal discovery, briefing and negotiating prior to trial, as well as coordinating
trial preparation and participating at trial.
8.

My rate for trial work in cases of this nature and size is $175.00 per hour for pretrial

litigation, and $225 per hour for trial preparation and trial work.
9.

Time records were kept by entering the time into a computer from which the billing

statements were generated. Exhibit "A" identifies the attorney who performed the service, sets forth
the date the service was performed, provides a description of the services rendered, itemizes the
amount oftime needed to perform the service, and computes the fee charged for the service. These
charges are consistent with the fees charged by other attorneys in this area oflaw with comparable
experience and skill.
lO.

Your Affiant has reviewed the provisions of Rule 54(e)(3) oftheldaho Rules of Civil

Procedure, which provides a list of criteria to be utilized by the Court in determining reasonable
attorneys fees. In evaluating the reasonableness of the fees charged herein, your Affiant would advise
the Court as follows:
(a)

Time and Labor Involved: I keep an accounting oftime spent on my cases.

I have reviewed all of the billing sheets generated from this case, including those submitted by Mr.
Wetherell's firm, and believe the time and labor reported were reasonably and necessarily incurred
to provide a proper defense and representation in this matter.
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(b)

Novelty and Difficulty: I believe this case was somewhat complex with

respect to the contractual and licensing issues raised at summary judgment and again presented at
trial.
(c)

Skill, Experience and Ability: I have been practicing for more than 20 years,

during which time I have frequently engaged in civil litigation and have handled many contested
matters. I feel I am qualified to act as trial counsel in civil litigation matters based upon my
background and experience.
(d)

Prevailing Charges: The rates charged in this case are standard, customary

and comparable to other amounts charged for trial work for private clients for this type of case. As
such, I believe that our charges in this case are consistent with, or lower than, the fees charged by
other attorneys in the area with comparable experience. In doing so, I would note the recent
Supreme Court case of Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702 (2009). In that case, the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized the District Court's finding in another real estate case that trial work in
the Boise area ranges from $250.00 an hour to $400.00 an hour. See id. at 777, 203 P.3d at 707.
(e)

Fee: The fee arrangement among Defendants, Mr. Wetherell and me provides

for hourly billings consistent with the rates set forth in Exhibit "A."
(f)

Time Limitations: I had time limitations to the extent that I am a solo

practitioner, and much of my work on this case was done without help from other attorneys or a
paralegal. In contrast, Plaintiff had more than one attorney handling much of this matter, including
attendance at hearings. As such, my association with Mr. Wetherell for support in trial was not only
reasonable and appropriate, but necessary to properly defend this case.
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(g)

AmountInvolved & Results Obtained: In its Complaint, Plaintiff demanded

$17,500 under the 2005 employment contract and $202,500 under the 2007 employment contract
for a total of $220,000. Defendants offered to settle the case for $75,000 in new money, plus allow
Plaintiff to keep $22,500 already in its possession. This was done in an effort to resolve this matter
without the time, expense and fees associated with trial. Plaintiffrefused to accept Defendants' offer,
and instead demanded $275,000. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of
correspondence from Plaintiffs counsel to me dated March 26, 2009. This correspondence
demanded $275,000 to resolve the case. Thus, Plaintiffs demand forced this case to proceed to trial.
At trial, Defendants received a complete defense verdict on these claims and Plaintiff was awarded
nothing. Defendants also were awarded the nominal amount requested of $1,000 on their claim
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Defendants did not recover on their claim for conversion.
(h)

Undesirability of Case: I do not know of any undesirable feature on the case.

(i)

Professional Relationship: I have known the Defendants for several years

and have represented them in other matters.
(j)

Award in Similar Cases: Awards in similar disputes vary widely depending

upon the terms of the particular contracts and the broker's interactions with consumers.
(k)

Computer-Assisted Research: I use, and did utilize in this case, computer-

assisted research. The cost of computer research is not inexpensive, but I often view this cost as a
part of doing business and did not pass this cost on to the client. As such, I have not requested
reimbursement for this cost. I believe computer assisted research is appropriate to maximize an
attorney's time and minimize the fees charged to the chent.
(1)

Other Factors: I know of no other factors.
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Based upon the foregoing, I have incurred $ 74, 392.50 in attorneys fees and $2,409.80

in costs for my services rendered on behalf of Defendants. These fees and costs are separate and
distinct from those incurred by Mr. Wetherell's firm on behalf of Defendants. Thus, the total amount
of attorneys fees incurred on behalf of Defendants by Mr. Wetherell's firm and me is $110,307.50,
and the total cost incurred by Defendants is $3,533.34. Further, I believe these amounts were
reasonably and necessarily incurred in this case on behalf of Defendants for their successful
representation.
12.

Your Affiant reserves the right to supplement this affidavit with additional costs and

fees pending the resolution ofthe post-trial motions.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

il-f

Dated this ~ day of July, 2009

(~

By______________~____________________
DEREK A. PICA
Attorneys for Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

~ay of July, 2009.

Residing
Commission expires:

-....-4-~::=...-tl______.......",:....L.-.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \
of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

u.s. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

Robert T. Wetherell
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KNIPE V. ROBERTSON
SUMMARY
(FEES & COSTS)

Derek A. Pica
Attorney's fees
Attorney's fees (trial prep & trial)

291.9 hours x 175.00 = $ 51,082.50
103.6 hours x 225.00 = $ 23,310.00

TOTAL ATTORNEY'S FEES:

$ 74,392.50

Deposition Costs
M & M Court Reporting (Richard Robertson)
Burnham Habel (John Knipe & Rowena Strain)
TOTAL DEPOSITION COSTS:

$
$

324.58
981.00

$ 1,305.58

Mediation (Elam Burke)
Filing Fees
Postage
Copies (2,440 x .15)

$
$
$
$

TOTAL:

$ 76,802.30

547.10
71.00
120.12
366.00

EXHIBIT

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette ID 83661

In Reference To:
Corporate matters
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

4/16/08 DAP Telephone conference with client;
review Complaints and analyze;
research Real Estate Code and
statute of fraud issues; analyze
Knipe "Employment Contracts," Review
ethical rules for realtors

4.50

787.50

4/17/08 DAP Telephone conference with Johnnie;
continue research on statute of
frauds and community property issues
relating to Employment Agreement;
telephone conference with Richard
regarding contracts and venue

2.70

472.50

4/18/08 DAP Draft letter to client; research
venue issue

0.70

122.50

4/22/08 DAP Review extensions; review documents
provided by client

1. 30

227.50

For professional services rendered

9.20 $1,610.00

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

2

Additional charges:
Amount
4/23/08 Postage
Copies
Total costs

2.15
3.90
$6.05

Total amount of this bill

$1,616.05

Balance due

$1,616.05

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH APRIL 23, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH APRIL 24, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH.
ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise 10 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette 10 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

4/30/08 DAP Review contracts as to venue; draft
Motion for Change of Venue

0.80

140.00

5/11/08 OAP Draft Answer; research affirmative
defenses; begin draft of Counterclaim

3.40

595.00

5/12/08 OAP Draft Third Party Claim; research
duty of brokers; research
pre-judgment interest issue in
conversion case

3.20

560.00

5/13/08 OAP Revise draft of Answer and Third
Party Complaint; draft letter to
clients

1. 70

297.50

5/14/08 OAP Telephone conference with cient
regarding Answer and Third Party
Complaint

0.20

35.00

5/19/08 OAP Review Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Change of Venue; review
supporting Affidavit; telephone
conference with Richard Robertson;
draft Affidavit of Richard Robertson

3.30

577.50

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

Hours

Amount

2.70

472.50

5/20/08 DAP Research venue issues
For professional services rendered

2

15.30 $2,677.50

Additional charges:
4/29/08 Filing fee paid to Clerk of Court
5/20/08 Postage
Copies
Total costs

71. 00
2.57
2.85
$76.42

Total amount of this bill

$2,753.92

Previous balance

$1,616.05

Balance due

$4,369.97

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH MAY 22, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH MAY 22, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise 10 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette 10 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

5/29/08 DAP Research venue issues; begin draft
of Memorandum in Response to
Memorandum in Opposition

3.70

647.50

5/30/08 DAP Complete draft of Memorandum in
Response to Opposition Memorandum

2.30

402.50

6/2/08 DAP Research Consumer Protection Act
issues; telephone conference with
Mark Geston

1. 50

262.50

6/9/08 DAP Prepare for hearing; attend Hearing
on Motion for Change of Venue;
telephone conference with Richard
Robertson; draft Order Changing
Venue; draft letter to Court; review
proposed Protective Order

2.40

420.00

6/10/08 DAP Review Interrogatoreis, Request for
Admissions and Request for
Production of Documents and analyze;
draft letter to clients

0.80

140.00

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

2

Hours

Amount

6/16/08 DAP Telephone conference with Richard
Robertson regarding discovery;
review E-mail from Mark Geston
regarding Protective Order; review
changes made to proposed Protective
Order

0.60

105.00

6/18/08 DAP Research Consumer Protection Act;
draft Counterclaim

2.40

420.00

6/20/08 DAP Continue research on Consumer
Protection Act issue

1. 30

227.50

For professional services rendered

15.00 $2,625.00

Additional charges:
6/20/08 Postage
Copies
Total costs

6.15
15.90
$22.05

Total amount of this bill

$2,647.05

Previous balance

$4,369.97

Balance due

$7,017.02

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH JUNE 23, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH JUNE 23, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Robertson Kennels,

Inc.

Page

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

2,647.05

2,753.92

1,616.05

0.00

0.00

3

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette ID 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

6/25/08 DAP Begin draft of Responses to Request
for Admissions

1. 40

245.00

6/26/08 DAP Complete draft of Responses to
Request for Admissions; draft
Answers to Interrogatories; draft
Responses to Request for Production
of Documents

5.70

997.50

6/27/08 DAP Finalize draft of discovery
responses; draft Letter to Richard
Robertson

1. 00

175.00

7/1/08 DAP Draft letter to Mark Geston;
telephone conference with Mark
Geston; research discovery issues in
regard to effect of change of venue

1. 30

227.50

7/2/08 DAP Draft letter to Mark Geston

0.30

52.50

1. 30

227.50

7/14/08 DAP Finalize Answer, Counterclaim and
Third Party Complaint; draft
Acceptance of Service; draft letter
to Mark Geston

/~Ol

Page

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

7/18/08 DAP Review discovery responses; Draft
Notice of Service; draft
Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents

2

Hours

Amount

3.00

525.00

14.00 $2,450.00

For professional services rendered
Additional charges:

14.00

7/16/08 Paid to Clerk of Court

3.61

7/22/08 Postage

12.60

Copies

$30.21

Total costs
Total amount of this bill

$2,480.21

Previous balance

$7,017.02

Balance due

$9,497.23

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH JULY 23, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH JULY 23, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

2,480.21

2,647.05

2,753.92

1,616.05

0.00

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette ID 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

7/24/08 DAP Draft Requests for Admission; draft
Notice of Service

1. 60

280.00

7/28/08 DAP Review letter from opposing counsel;
review Deposition Notices; draft
letter to clients

0.40

70.00

8/5/08 DAP Review Knipe Land Company's Response
to Counterclaim; draft letter to
clients; review documents from First
American Title; draft second letter
to clients

1. 40

245.00

8/12/08 DAP Review E-mail and respond; draft
letter to clients

0.40

70.00

8/18/08 DAP Telephone conference with Richard
Robertson regarding Depositions

0.20

35.00

4.00

$700.00

For professional services rendered

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

2

Additional charges:
Amount
8/21/08 Postage

8.80

Copies

32.70

Total costs

$41. 50

Total amount of this bill

$741. 50

Previous balance

$9,497.23

Balance due

$10,238.73

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH AUGUST 22, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH AUGUST 22, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH.
ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

3,221.71

0.00

2,647.05

2,753.92

1,616.05

1'101

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette ID 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

8/25/08 DAP Office conference with clients;
attend deposition

4.70

822.50

8/26/08 DAP Draft Second Set of Interrogatories
and Request for Production of
Documents

0.70

122.50

5.40

$945.00

For professional services rendered
Additional charges:

2.19

9/22/08 Postage
Copies

2.85
$5.04

Total costs
Total amount of this bill

$950.04
$10,238.73

Previous balance

I&J05

Page

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

2

Amount
$11,188.77

Balance due
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted

FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

950.04

3,221.71

0.00

2,647.05

4,369.97

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise 10 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette 10 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services

9/24/08 OAP Review Request for Trial Setting;
draft Response to Request for Trial
Setting
For professional services rendered

Hours

Amount

0.40

70.00

0.40

$70.00

Additional charges:
10/22/08 Postage

1. 85

Copies

1. 95

Total costs

$3.80

Total amount of this bill

$73.80

Previous balance

$11,188.77

Balance due

$11,262.57

/~07

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH OCTOBER 23, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH OCTOBER 23, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

1,023.84

0.00

3,221.71

0.00

7,017.02

2

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise 10 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette 10 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

11/11/08 DAP Begin review of documents from
discovery response; begin draft of
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment

5.80

1,015.00

11/12/08 OAP Continue draft of Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment; review discovery documents
produced by Knipe

6.50

1,137.50

11/13/08 OAP Continue draft of Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

1.30

227.50

For professional services rendered

13.60 $2,380.00

Additional charges:
11/3/08 Payment to M & M Court Reporting for Deposition
Costs

324.58

Page

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

2

Amount
$324.58

Total costs

$2,704.58

Total amount of this bill
Previous balance

$11,262.57

Balance due

$13,967.15

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH NOVEMBER 24, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH NOVEMBER 25, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH.
ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

2,704.58

73.80

950.04

741.50

9,497.23

1'110

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise 10 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette 10 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2 1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

11/26/08 DAP Review Scheduling Order and
calendar; draft letter to client

0.50

87.50

12/4/08 DAP Continue draft of Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

3.20

560.00

12/17/08 DAP Review Motion for Summary Judgment
filed on behalf of Knipe; review
Affidavits in Support; review
Memorandum in Support of Knipe's
Motion for Summary Judgment and
analyze; continue draft of
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment

4.70

822.50

12/18/08 DAP Continue draft of Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment; research Statute of Frauds
issues raised by Knipe's Memorandum

4.70

822.50

/9//

Robertson Kennels,

Page

Inc.

2

Hours

Amount

12/19/08 DAP Continue draft of Memorandum,
research public policy issues

4.30

752.50

12/22/08 DAP Research public policy issues;
continue draft of Memorandum

4.00

700.00

12/23/08 DAP Continue draft of Memorandum;
research waiver issues

6.50

1,137.50

12/24/08 DAP Review documents produced in
discovery; continue draft of
Memorandum

5.40

945.00

12/26/08 DAP Continue research on waiver issue;
continue draft of Memorandum

2.40

420.00

35.70 $6,247.50

For professional services rendered
Previous balance

$13,967.15

Balance due

$20,214.65

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH DECEMBER 26, 2008
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH DECEMBER 26, 2008
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH.
ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

6,247.50

2,704.58

73.80

950.04

10,238.73

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette ID 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

12/29/08 DAP Research Consumer Protection Act
issues; continue draft of
Memorandum; telephone conference
with client

5.30

927.50

12/30/08 DAP Office conference with Richard
Robertson; draft Affidavit of
Richard Robertson; prepare Exhibits;
continue draft of Memorandum;
research tortious conversion issues

7.40

1,295.00

12/31/08 DAP Complete draft of Memorandum; draft
Motion for Summary Judgment; draft
Affidavit

5.30

927.50

1. 80

315.00

3.80

665.00

1/9/09 DAP Review Knipe Land's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and analyze;
research issues raised in response
1/12/09 DAP Research forfeiture issues raised in
Reply Brief; research Statute of
Fraud issues

I'/~

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

2

Hours

Amount

1/14/09 DAP Review Supplemental Reply Brief and
analyze; prepare for hearing

2.30

402.50

1/15/09 DAP Prepare for hearing

3.80

665.00

1/16/09 DAP Prepare for hearing; travel to
Payette

5.80

1,015.00

For professional services rendered

35.50 $6,212.50

Additional charges:
1. 51

1/21/09 Postage

4.50

Copies
Total costs

$6.01
$6,218.51

Total amount of this bill
Previous balance

$20,214.65

Balance due

$26,433.16

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH JANUARY 22, 2009
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH JANUARY 22, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

12,466.01

2,704.58

0.00

73.80

11,188.77

DEREK A. PICA
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise ID 83702
336-4144

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette ID 83661

In Reference To:
Knipe vs. Robertson
Invoice #2-1582.01
Professional services
Hours

Amount

1/26/09 DAP Review Reply Memorandum and analyze

1. 30

227.50

1/27/09 DAP Begin draft of Reply Memorandum

2.70

472.50

1/28/09 DAP Continue draft of Reply Memorandum

4.80

840.00

1/29/09 DAP Complete draft of Reply Memorandum

3.70

647.50

2/6/09 DAP Prepare for Summary Judgment
Argument; attend Summary Judgment
Hearing in Payette

4.70

822.50

2/17/09 DAP Review Decision and analyze;
telephone conference with client

0.40

70.00

2/18/09 DAP Draft letter to client

0.30

52.50

For professional services rendered

ICJ /5

17.90 $3,132.50

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

2

Additional charges:
Amount
2/20/09 Postage

5.80

Copies

10.65
$16.45

Total costs
Total amount of this bill

$3,148.95

Previous balance

$26,433.16

Balance due

$29,582.11

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH FEBRUARY 23, 2009
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH FEBRUARY 23, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY
UNPAID BALANCE.

Current

30 Days

60 Days

90 Days

120 Days

3,148.95

6,218.51

6,247.50

2,704.58

11,262.57

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette, ID 83661

March 30, 2009
In Reference To:

Knipe v. Robertson

Invoice #10056

Professional Services
Hrs/Rate

Amount

2.40
175.00/hr

420.00

3/4/2009 Attend Mediation; draft Deposition Notices

4.40
175.00/hr

770.00

3/6/2009 Research Doctrine of Merger issues

3.00
175.00/hr

525.00

3/7/2009 Research integration issues

3.40
175.00/hr

595.00

3/3/2009 Draft Mediation Statement; telephone conference with John Magel; telephone

conference with client

For professional services rendered

13.20

$2,310.00

Additional Charges:
3/23/2009 Postage

Copying cost
Total additional charges
Total amount of this bill

5.13
4.95
$10.08
$2,320.08

Accounts receivable transactions
11/28/2008 Starting balance
12/28/2008 Starting balance
112712009 Starting balance

$11,262.57
$2,704.58
$6,247.50

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page
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Amount
2/26/2009 Starting balance
3/28/2009 Starting balance

$6,218.51
$3,148.95

Total payments and adjustments

$29,582.11

Balance due

$31,902.19

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
Professional services rendered through March 23, 2009
Payments received through March 27, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE
A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE.

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette, ID 83661

April 27, 2009
In Reference To:

Knipe v. Robertson

Invoice #10121

Professional Services
Hrs/Rate

Amount

3/24/2009 Review division of earnest money issues

2.00
175.00/hr

350.00

3/25/2009 Research division of earnest money issue at law library

2.30
175.00/hr

402.50

3/26/2009 Review letter from Mark Geston; draft letter to client; research modification
issues

2.40
175.00/hr

420.00

3/27/2009 Research modification issues at law library; draft Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment

4.60
175.00/hr

805.00

3/29/2009 Continue draft of Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summa;ry Judgment;
ressearch modification issue

2.40
175.00/hr

420.00

3/30/2009 Complete draft of Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
draft Motion for Summary Judgment; draft letter to Mark Geston; draft letter to
client; review documents produced in discovery

4.40
175.00/hr

770.00

4/6/2009 Telephone conference with Mark Geston

0.20
175.00/hr

35.00

4/7/2009 Prepare for Deposition of Rowena Strain

4.00
175.00/hr

700.00

4/8/2009 Prepare for Deposition of Rowena Strain; partiCipate in Deposition; prepare for
Deposition of John Knipe

8.00
175.00/hr

1,400.00

4/9/2009 Prepare for Deposition of John Knipe; attend Deposition of John Knipe

9.20
175.00/hr

1,610.00

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page
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39.50

For professional services rendered

2

Amou nt
$6,912.50

Additional Charges:

4/23/2009 Postage

3.70

Copying cost

2.85

Total additional charges

$6.55

Total amount of this bill

$6,919.05

Previous balance

$31,902.19

Balance due

$38,821.24

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
Professional services rendered through April 23, 2009
Payments received through April 24, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE
A 1 % PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE.

11 :1..0

DEREK A. PICA, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette, ID 83661

May 26, 2009
In Reference To:

Knipe v. Robertson

Invoice #10190

Professional Services
Hrs/Rate
4/24/2009 Review Motion to Amend Complaint and Motion in Limine and analyze; research

voluntary payment issue; draft letter to client
4/26/2009 Research voluntary payment issue; research parol evidence issues

Amount

1.80
175.00/hr

315.00

4.00

700.00

175.00/hr
4/28/2009 Research voluntary payment issue

4/29/2009 Draft Motion to Reconsider; begin draft of supporting Memorandum

1.30
175.00/hr

227.50

4.70

822.50

175.00/hr
4/30/2009 Draft Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider; draft supporting

Affidavit; research forfeiture issues in regard to breach of contract

7.80

1,365.00

175.00/hr

1.40
175.00/hr

245.00

2.30
175.00/hr

402.50

5/2/2009 Research when broker earns a commission and public policy issues

3.40
175.00/hr

595.00

5/3/2009 Begin draft of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend for Punitive

4.00
175.00/hr

700.00

3.40
175.00/hr

595.00

5/112009 Research parol evidence issues

Research earnest moneyh issue and when broker earns a commission

Damages
5/4/2009 Continue draft of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Punitive Damages

Page

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

HrslRate

2

Amount

4.80
175.00/hr

840.00

4.80
175.00/hr

840.00

7.30
175.00/hr

1,277.50

5/8/2009 Draft Reply Memorandum to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

6.30
175.00/hr

1,102.50

5/14/2009 Review Plaintiff's Reply Memorandums to Motion to Amend and Motion in

5.40
175.00/hr

945.00

5/15/2009 Prepare for Hearing; attend Hearing in Payette

7.00
175.00/hr

1,225.00

5/19/2009 Review Supplemental Briefing and analyze

0.70
175.00/hr

122.50

5/20/2009 Review Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production to

2.80
175.00/hr

490.00

5/5/2009 Continue draft of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend; draft Affidavit

of Richard Robertson
5/6/2009 Complete draft of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend; complete

draft of Affidavit of Richard Robertson; review Memorandum in Support of
Motion in Limine and analyze
5/7/2009 Draft Reply Memorandum to Mlotion in Limine; review Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and analyze; research cases raised
in opposition memorandum

Limine and analyze; prepare for Hearing

Defendants; telephone conference with Richard Robertson; draft Answers to
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents; review Third Request
for Production of Documents; draft Responses to Third Set of Request for
Production
For professional services rendered

73.20

$12,810.00

Additional Charges:
5/112009 Deposition Costs paid to Court Reporters
5/21/2009 Postage

Copying cost

981.00
38.61
140.25

Total additional charges

$1,159.86

Total amount of this bill

$13,969.86

Previous balance

$38,821.24

Balance due

$52,791.10

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
Professional services rendered through May 21, 2009
Payments received through May 22, 2009
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE
A 1 % PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE.
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DEREK A. PICA, PLLC

Attorney at Law
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice submitted to:
Robertson Kennels, Inc.
8719 Little Willow Road
Payette, ID 83661

July 07,2009
In Reference To:

Knipe v. Robertson

Invoice #10278

Professional Services
Hrs/Rate

Amount

6/8/2009 Telephone conference with Eric Bjorkman

0.30
225.00/hr

67.50

6/9/2009 Telephone conference with Mark Norem

0.20
225.00/hr

45.00

6/10/2009 Review Decision on Motions and analyze; draft letter to client; begin draft of Jury

Instructions
6/11/2009 Review E-mails from Mark Geston; continue draft of Jury Instructions; prepare

for Trial
6/12/2009 Finalize Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions; review proposed Stipulation

of Facts; draft letter to Mark Geston; continue preparing tor Trial
6/14/2009 Telephone conference with client; prepare Exhibits; review Plaintiffs Exhibit List;

revise proposed Stipulated Facts; prepare for Trial
6/15/2009 Draft Exhibit List; draft Witness List; begin draft of Trial Brief; research definition

6.30

1,417.50

225.00/hr

7.60

1,710.00

225.00/hr

2.40
225.00/hr
6.50

540.00
1,462.50

225.00/hr

6.70
225.00/hr

1,507.50

6/16/2009 Research forfeiture issue; draft Trial Brief; review and respond to E-mails;

7.70

1,732.50

prepare for Trial; telephone conference with Richard Robertson

225.00/hr

of forfeit; prepare for Trial

6/17/2009 Review each Exhibit listed by Plaintiff to determine whether to stipulate;

telephone conference with MidAmerica's attorney regarding confidentiality
agreement and Cindy Crane; prepare for Trial
6/18/2009 Draft letter to Mark Geston; review Motion in Limine; draft Objection to Motion in

Limine; draft supporting Affidavit; prepare for Trial

3.80

855.00

225.00/hr

2.40
225.00/hr

540.00

Page

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Hrs/Rate

2

Amount

6/19/2009 Review proposed Stipulation regarding Exhibits; review Motion regarding
Protective Order and analyze; office conference with cllient; conference with
Bob Wetherell; prepare for Trial

5.80
225.00/hr

1,305.00

6/20/2009 Preparation for Trial

7.00
225.00/hr

1,575.00

6/21/2009 Preparation for Trial

3.40
225.00/hr

765.00

6/22/2009 Telephone conference with Mark Norem's Office; draft Affidavit of Mark Norem;
office conference with client; prepare for Trial

7.50
225.00/hr

1,687.50

6/23/2009 Prepare for Trial; travel to Payette and attend Trial

12.00
225.00/hr

2,700.00

6/24/2009 Travel to Payette and attend Trial

11.50
225.00/hr

2,587.50

6/25/2009 Travel to Payette; attend Trial

12.50
225.00/hr

2,812.50

For professional services rendered

103.60

$23,310.00

Additional Charges:
6/22/2009 Postage

Copying cost
Total additional charges
Total amount of this bill

38.05
130.05
$168.10
$23,478.10

Accounts receivable transactions
3/912009 Starting balance

$52,791.10

Total payments and adjustments

$52,791.10

Balance due

$76,269.20

VISA and MASTERCARD accepted
Professional services rendered through June 25, 2009
Payments received through June 22, 2009

Robertson Kennels, Inc.

Page

ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE
A 1 % PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE.
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STOEL

101 S. Capitol !!Qulc:vard. Suite 1900
Boise. Idaho 83702

q;,~,?

main 208.389.9000

!'ax 208.389.9040
wwwstocl.com

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

MARK S. GESTON

Direct (208) 387-4291

March 26, 2009

msgesto~@stoel.com

VIAE-MAIL
Derek A. Pica, PLLC
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

Re:

Knipe Land Company v. Robertson

Dear Derek:
In response to your clients' prior offer of $75,000 as full settlement of this controversy, Plaintiff
counter-proposes a full settlement in exchange for a cash payment of $275,000. I believe that we
fully aired our respective clients' positions during the mediation, so I will not repeat those
arguments. I'm sure this proposal will receive your clients' serious consideration, and I look
forward to their response.
Sincerely;

Mark S. Geston
MSG/sIg
cc: clients

Oregon
Washington
California

Boise-219543.1 0010908-00008
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Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION FOR EQUITABLE
RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 1

/'1~V

COME NOW, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter "'Defendants") by and through
their counsel of record, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and hereby move the Court for additional
equitable reliefunder the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, including but not limited to, the provisions
and remedies set forth in I.C. § 48-608(1). Specifically, the Court should utilize its equitable
remedies under the Act and impose a constructive trust and grant restitutionary damages relating to
the $22,500.00 plus interest that Plaintiff and/or Third-party Defendant kept in its possession from
the 2007 employment contract. Additionally, the Court should grant an Order enjoining Plaintiff
from utilizing any broker employment contract containing the violative "Forfeiture" provision.
Finally, the Court should award Defendants punitive damages under the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act.

This motion is supported by a corresponding legal memorandum, filed contemporaneously

herewith.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this ,!3'day of July, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP

erell, Of the Firm
ttomeys for Defendants

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ay of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:

~.

Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 3

I'~O

n~« <iL...i-u
Il P.p.
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ORIGINAL
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
vs.

DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTY
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER THE
IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.

DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTYPLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFMOTIONFOREQUITABLE
RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 1
<
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COME NOW, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") by and through
their counsel of record, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and provide this Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Equitable Reliefunder the Idaho Consumer Protection Act as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION
After the closing of both parties' cases at trial, the Court took up its potential jury
instructions. At that time, counsel for Defendants requested that the jury be instructed on punitive
damages, which decision by the jury would be advisory to the Court under its authority pursuant to
the Act. The Court declined the request, and instead stated it would consider such evidence if and
when the jury found liability under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act.
At trial, the jury granted Defendants their requested amount of nominal damages under the
Act. Significantly, the facts at trial showed that Plaintiffandlor Mr. John Knipe purposefully waited
to disclose to Defendants that they were seeking their all eged earnest money. Plaintiffhad not sought
such money under the 2005 employment agreement. As such, Plaintiff did not notify Defendants of
this fact until Defendants renewed their 2007 representation agreement with Plaintiff. Further, the
evidence showed that Plaintiff utilized a contract that would give it more money by not closing on
the transactions under the 2007 contract, than it would have received in real estate commissions had
the transaction closed.
Defendants now move the Court to grant the equitable remedies enumerated under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act. Under the Act, the Court is allowed to grant particular remedies to

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTYPLAINTIFFS'MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFMOTIONFOREQUITABLE
RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 2
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Defendants on their claim. This Memorandum will show that the Court should: (1) impose a
constructive trust and grant restitutionary damages for the return of monies improperly held by
Plaintiff; (2) enjoin Plaintiff from future use of its forfeiture provision, (3) grant punitive damages
to Defendants, and (4) grant Defendants prejudgment interest.
As such, the Court should grant the instant Motion.
II.

ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act allows a party to seek equitable relief from the Court
as well as actual or statutory damages. See I.C. § 48-608(1). The Act states as to this issue:
48-608. Loss from purchase or lease -- Actual and punitive
damages.
(1) . . . Any such person or class may also seek restitution, an
order enjoining the use or employment of methods, acts or practices declared unlawful under this chapter and any other appropriate relief which the court in its discretion may deem just and
necessary. The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages
and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or
proper in cases of repeated or flagrant violations.
See I.C. § 48-608(1).
A.

The Court Should Impose a Constructive Trust and Restitutionary Damages
for the Return of Money Held by Plaintiff.

The Court should impose a constructive trust and require the return of monies held by
Plaintiff. As set forth above, Courts may grant any appropriate relief to parties that bring suit
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See I.e. 48-608(1). In this case,the Court should
impose a constructive trust and order the return of all monies held by Plaintiff from the 2007

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EQUITABLE
RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 3
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transaction. Plaintiff admitted from the stand and in deposition testimony that there is no
contractual provision allowing Plaintiff to withhold the $22,500 and that it was deducted and
held in anticipation of closing.
Under Idaho law, constructive trusts are equitable in nature and are invoked where title to
property "is found in one who in fairness ought not to be allowed to retain it." Clein v. Shaw,
109 Idaho 237,240, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. 1985). Once a constructive trust is imposed,
the party holding the property is treated as ifhe or she were a trustee from the date of the
wrongful holding. Id. Thus, the trustee is required to reconvey the property. Id. Further, a
constructive trust applies where a party obtains property in any ''unconscientious manner." See

id.
The need for a constructive trust in this matter is clear. Plaintiff retained $22,500 in
money owed to Defendants under the transaction with Mid-America. Therefore, this property
must be reconveyed by Plaintiff to Defendants. The jury found that Defendants did not breach
the 2007 employment agreement, but rather that Plaintiff violated the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act. As a result, the Court should apply its equitable authority and impose a constructive trust.
This order from the Court will allow for the return of the money along with pre-judgment interest
from the "date of the wrongful holding" by Plaintiff. As such, equity invokes this result.
This result is consistent with the remedy of restitution under the Act. Although restitution
is not an automatic or mandatory remedy under the Act, it is clearly one that Courts may invoke.
See Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 455,615 P.2d 116, 124 (1980).
Further, a district court's discretion to award restitutionary relief should be exercised with a view

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-P ARTY PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EQUITABLE
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towards the Act's purpose. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the need for proper
restitution under the Act. In its holding in Kidwell, stating:
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act indicates a legislative intent to
deter deceptive or unfair trade practices and to provide relief for
consumers exposed to proscribed practices. Businesses faced only
with the possibility of a perspective injunctive order would have
little incentive to avoid commercial practices of dubious legality.
Only a substantial likelihood that defendants who have engaged in
unfair or deceptive trade practices will be subject to restitutionary
orders will deter many with a mind to engage in sharp practices.
Id. at 455-56,615 P.2d at 124-25 (emphasis added).

Further, the Court in Kidwell cited approvingly of other case authority holding that
wrongdoers should not be allowed to retain "the considerable benefits of their unlawful conduct."
Id. at 456,615 P.2d at 125. Thus, restitution under the Act includes the surrendering of all

monies taken in association with the party's violation of the Act. Id. (quoting Fletcher v.
Security Pacific Nat. Bank, 591 P.2d 51,57 (Cal. 1979»("One requirement of such enforcement
is a basic policy that those who have engaged in proscribed conduct surrender all profits flowing
therefrom.") .
As a result, the Court in this matter should grant restitutionary damages as Plaintiff s
actions have been deemed to violate the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See Ans. to Question 6
of Verdict Form. Specifically, the evidence at trial showed that Plaintiff could make more
money under a contract by not closing on transactions and by continuing to re-enlist Defendants
under a new representation contract. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff kept $22,500.00 from a
transaction under the 2007 Employment Contract while at the same time violating the Act. The
Plaintiff did this despite no contractual authority to do so. The granting of restitution of damages

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTYPLAINTIFFS'MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFMOTIONFOREQUITABLE
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will further the legislative intent to deter deceptive and unfair trade practices and provide relief to
Defendants as consumers. Thus, Plaintiff should be required to surrender the benefits/profits
made from its violative conduct. See Kidwell, 101 Idaho at 456,615 P.2d at 125; see also Great

Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 767,979 P.2d 627, 640
(1999)(stating that restitution or unjust enrichment provides that one party will "render to the
person entitled thereto that which in equity and good conscience belongs to the latter").

B.

The Court Should Enjoin Plaintiff from Future Use of its "Forfeiture"
Provision as contained in its Broker Employment Contracts.

The Court should grant injunctive relief to ensure that Plaintiff does not engage in similar
conduct with other consumers in the future. Under the Act, a court is empowered to grant an
order "enjoining the use or employment of methods, acts or practices declared unlawful"
pursuant to the Act. See I.C. § 48-608(1). As set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court, the use of
injunctive relief is needed under the Act, otherwise "(b)usinesses faced only with the possibility
of a prospective injunctive order would have little incentive to avoid commercial practices of
dubious legality." Kidwell, 101 Idaho at455, 615 P.2d at 124.
In this matter, injunctive relief is needed to ensure that Plaintiff does not re-use the same
practices found to violate the Act. This will prevent numerous other consumers from experiencing the same situation that occurred in the instant matter. As a result, the Court should grant
injunctive reliefto enjoin future use and business practices associated with Plaintiffs forfeiture
provision as contained in its broker employment contracts.

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EQUITABLE
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C.

The Court Should Grant Punitive Damages to Defendants.

After the closing of both parties' cases, the Court took up its potential jury instructions.
At that time, counsel for Defendants requested that the jury be instructed on punitive damages,
which decision by the jury would be advisory to the Court under its authority pursuant to the Act.
The Court declined this invitation and instead stated it would consider such evidence at a later
time.
The Court now should grant punitive damages to Defendants under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act. The Act states regarding the award of punitive damages:
The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may
provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary and proper in
cases of repeated or flagrant violations.
See I.C. § 48-608(1).
As such, a party does not have to show extreme deviation from reasonable standards of
conduct or other similar items, but merely must show that the offending party repeatedly or
flagrantly violated the Act. See Mack Tools, Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 198,879 P.2d 1126,
1131 (1994). Notably, this punitive damage standard under the Act is not an abrogation or
codification of common law punitive damages, but rather presents an entirely new remedy
created by the Legislature. See id.
In determining punitive damages under the Act, the Court should look to the situation

taken as a whole. See In Re. Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839, 883 (D. Idaho 2007). Further, an award of
punitive damages under the Act is appropriate to both punish the violating party's conduct, and
to deter any similar future activities. See id.
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As the Court is well aware, the amount of actual damages recovered is irrelevant to
punitive damages, as the awarding of nominal damages is sufficient to support a punitive damage
award. See id. (citing Crosby v. Rowand Machinery Co., 111 Idaho 939, 729 P.2d 414,419 (Ct.
App. 1996) and Young v. Scott, 108 Idaho 506, 700 P.2d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 1985)).
At trial, the jury granted Defendants their requested amount of nominal damages under
the Act. Significantly, the facts at trial showed that Plaintiff purposefully waited to disclose to
Defendants that they were seeking their alleged earnest money. Plaintiff had not sought such
money under the 2005 employment agreement. As such, Plaintiff did not notify Defendants of
this fact until Defendants renewed their 2007 representation agreement with Plaintiff. Further,
the evidence showed that Plaintiff utilized a contract that would give it more money by not
closing on the transactions under the 2007 contracts, than would be received in real estate
commissions had the transaction closed. Finally, Defendant was fraudulently induced to enter
into an extension of the 2007 employment agreement by intentional non-disclosure of a demand
letter drafted but not presented until 2 days after Defendant's signature was obtained.

Please

see Exhibit "A" attached hereto and as previously admitted at trial. Plaintiffthen sued Defendant
in this action for breach of contract after Defendant refused to the extension he was fraudulently
induced to enter into.
Therefore, the Court should impose punitive damages. Defendant would request that
Plaintiffbe required to return the $22,500 plus interest and that proper punitive damages would
treble this amount. Therefore, Defendant seeks $67,500 in punitive damages to deter Plaintiff
from engaging in such deceptive practices in the future.

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EQUITABLE
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D.

Pre-Judgment Interest

The Court should grant pre-judgment interest to Defendants based upon the $22,500 that
Plaintiff received and held in his possession. As set forth above, Defendants are entitled to a
constmctive trust and restitutionary damages in this amount from the date in which the unlawful
holding or taking of these monies occurred. More specifically, Idaho statute grants pre-judgment
interest where money is "received to the use of another and retained beyond a reasonable time
without the owner's consent." See I.e. § 28-22-104(4). Further, pre-judgment interest merely
requires that the damages be liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical process. Ross v.

Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276, 178 P.3d 639,641 (Ct. App. 2007)(citation omitted).
In the instant action, Plaintiff received and held monies belonging to Defendants in the

amount of $22,500. These monies have been retained beyond a reasonable time despite Defendants' demand for the return ofthese funds. As such, the Court should grant Defendants' prejudgment interest on the amount of $22,500 from the time Plaintiff failed to return the demanded
monies on February 11, 2008. See Exhibit "B" attached hereto and as previously admitted at
trial.
III.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Defendants' Motion for Equitable
Relief, including the imposition of a constmctive trust, restitutionary damages, enjoining Plaintiff
from future use of its forfeiture provision, and granting punitive damages and pre-judgment
interest.
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DATED this ~ay of July, 2009.

o rt . Wetherell, Of the Firm
torneys for Defendants

C

TIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this §day of July, 2009, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered
by the method and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

/u.s.

Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

"0
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Wed. Feb 20, 2008· 8:48 AM

Subject: FW: Richard Robertson
Date: Tuesday, February 19, 2008 10:45 PM
From: John Knipe <john@knipeland.com>
To: "sellerfile@knipeland.cotn n <sellerfile@knipeland.com>
- - - - Forwarded Message
From: John Kni.pe <john@knipeland.com>

Date: Ttiu, 14 Feb 2008 12:20:03 -1000
To: Rowena Strain <ronastrain@yahoo.com>
Subject: lte: Ri.cb.ar:d· Robertson

Rainy here but not cold.
sent from my iPhone
John Kn.ipe Designated Broker
Accredited Land Consultant
ABa ALe CRB GRI

John@knipeland.com

On Feb 14, 2008, at 9:11 AM, RoweIla Strain <ronastrain@yahoo.com> wrote:

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

John,
Let's not send that today. Let him get out the contract anq read
first. If you send today-I am afraid that he will be furious and
we will suffer our reputation. Why don't you wait for at least

tomorrow.
(I will hate yOu i f you are come back "water 199ged and all
from Stm tanning!)

Rowena

b:r:=

>

>
>
>
>

strain, GRI RLI 208-739-3883-Cell
Sales Associate ID/oR 642-3744--Dffice
Knipe Land Camp!UlY, me
rowena@knipeland.com
Rowena

- - - - End of Forwarded Message
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Wed. Feb 20, 2008 8:47 AM

Subject: ~e: payette property
Date: Monday, February 11, 2008 2:02 PM
From: RobertsonRanch@aol.com
To: <ron·astrain@yahoo.com>

RO\A/ena:
The $22,500.00 is the .05 percent real Astate fee for
selling the property and I thought since it didn't sell it
would come .back to us.
That is interesting on the Fre"nch company looking for a
place to build a plant,maybe somebody should get in touch
with them?
Richard

,7

The year's hottest artists on the red carpet at the Grammy Awards. AOL Music
takes you there. <http://music.aol,com/grammys?NCID=aolcmp00300000002565>

.'

-."

EXHIBIT

is

Page 1 of 1

KLC01861

Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346
Email: msgeston@stoel.com
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432
Email: jrnreinhardt@stoel.com
STOEL RIVES LLP
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 389-9000
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
v.

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,

PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND
JUDGMENT, FOR NEW TRIAL, OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third Party Defendant.

o ORIGINAL

PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR
NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT-l
Boise-221699.20010908-00008

COME NOW Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe
(collectively, "Knipe"), by and through their undersigned counsel, and move this Court under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to amend the Judgment entered on July 7, 2009. The
Judgment, as entered, impermissibly recites the pleadings in its numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3
in violation ofIdaho Rule Civil Procedure 54( a). The jury's verdict, on which the Judgment
should have been based, was complete and decided all issues framed by the parties in their
pleadings and tried to that jury, and the Court is without power to nevertheless declare the
Judgment as not being final until it so certifies the Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b). Furthermore, the Court is without power to keep this litigation open to allow Defendants
and Third Party Plaintiffs to file additional claims and causes of action under the Idaho
Consumer Protect Act, such parties having had a full and complete opportunity at trial to present
all claims for relief that they wished to assert.
Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59( a)(6) for new trial on
the ground that there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to justify the jury's verdict. The
said verdict was, additionally, against the law insofar as it denied Plaintiff any relief and,
equally, granted Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs a judgment of $1 ,000 against John Knipe
under Idaho Code § 48-608(1).
Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) for a new trial
on the ground that there were errors in law during the course of the trial that prejudiced their
substantial rights.
Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that application of the correct legal standards to the
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undisputed evidence adduced at trial requires the entry of judgment in Knipe's favor in the
principal amount of $220,000, together with prejudgment interest thereon.
This Motion is based on the matters on file herein, the evidence admitted at trial, the
Court's rulings at trial, and on the Memorandum oflaw submitted contemporaneously herewith.
DATED: July 2.0 ,2009.
STOEL RIVES LLP

~~L/
Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on July '2.0 ,2009, I served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF/
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR NEW
TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT on the following, in the matter indicated below:

Derek A. Pica, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 336-4144
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980
Email: derekpica@msn.com
Attorney for Defendants

[ ] Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[y-Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Robert T. Wetherell
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P. O. Box 1009
Boise,ID 83701-1009
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Email: rtw@brassey.net
Attorneys for Defendants

[ ] Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ '-t\'ia Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346
Email: msgeston@stoel.com
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com
STOEL RIVES LLP
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900
Boise,ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 389-9000
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,

Case No. CV 2008-682

PLAINTIFF/THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND
JUDGMENT, FOR NEW TRIAL, OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
v.

o ORIGINAL

JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third Party Defendant.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The jury's verdict denied Plaintiff Knipe Land Company ("KLC") any relief but granted
Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie L. Robertson, and
Robertson Kennels, Inc. (collectively, the "Robertsons") a judgment of $1 ,000 against Third
Party Defendant John Knipe for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (Idaho Code

§§ 48-603 and 48-608) (the "ICPA"). Over the objection ofKLC and Third Party Defendant
John Knipe (collectively, unless otherwise noted, "Knipe"), the Court entered Judgment in the
form requested by the Robertsons on July 7, 2009 (the "Judgment").
Knipe first moves the Court under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( e) to amend the
Judgment, first to eliminate the extensive recitation of the pleadings in its numbered paragraphs
1, 2, and 3. Such a narrative in a judgment is prohibited by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a).
Secondly, the Judgment improperly allows the Robertsons to file additional claims and
seek additional relief under the ICPA when, in fact, they had the fullest opportunity to litigate all
their claims under that statute and did so at trial.
Thirdly, the jury's verdict addressed all the Robertsons' claims under the ICPA and fully
resolved the present controversy, but the Judgment inexplicably declares itself not to be a final
judgment and invokes Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) as the authority for that
determination. But Rule 54(b) is only concerned with interlocutory rulings by a court that
resolve "one or more but less than all of the claims" in a given case. There is no rule, statute, or
authority that permits a court to unilaterally declare a judgment that embodies a verdict rendered
after trial of the entire controversy as being anything but a final judgment and impermissibly
grant a litigant a belated opportunity to introduce new claims and causes of action.
Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) for a new trial
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on the ground that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to justify the jury's verdict. The
critical language in the two contracts in controversy (the "Employment Contracts") was clear and
unambiguous, and the uncontradicted evidence and testimony showed that the monies paid by
the prospective purchasers of the Robertsons' land fell within the scope of that language, but that
the Robertsons had not complied with it. The only evidence at trial that could possibly be
inconsistent with that conclusion was the subjective "feeling" of Defendant Richard Robertson
that the Employment Contracts' language intended something it plainly did not say, and the
equally subjective testimony of the only other witness called by the Robertsons, Cindy Crane,
concerning the entirely separate land purchase contracts entered into by the Robertsons and her
employer, MidAmerican Nuclear Energy Co. LLC ("MidAmerican,,).l
Knipe also moves the Court under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( a)(7) for a new trial
on the ground that errors of law substantially prejudiced Knipe's rights and entitles them to a
new trial on all issues. Those errors of law consisted of the following:
(1)

The Court refused to decide whether the Employment Contracts were

ambiguous and improperly left that determination to the jury;
(2)

The Court permitted Mr. Robertson to interpret unambiguous agreements

for the jury;
(3)

The Court permitted Ms. Crane to interpret unambiguous agreements that

Knipe was not a party to and that the Court found in its June 9, 2009 Order on Motions
did not concern "the same fundamental subject matter" as the Employment Contracts;
(4)

The Court permitted Ms. Crane to testify even though the Robertsons had

1 Ms. Crane had nothing at all to say about the two Employment Contracts in
controversy.
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refused to respond to Interrogatories requesting them to disclose what relevant
knowledge they believed she possessed;
(5)

The Court allowed the Robertsons' counsel to cross-examine John Knipe

and Rowena Strain about the requirements Idaho Code § 54-2051 imposes on Idaho real
estate agents and brokers and to then argue the testimony thusly elicited to the jury at
closing, despite the Court's prior express finding in its Order on Motions on June 9, 2009,
at page 5, that such statutes are not applicable to civil controversies such as the one at
bar;
(6)

The Court refused to submit Knipe's requested opening Instruction No.5,

and closing Instruction Nos. 7, 12, 15, 19, and 20;
(7)

The Court gave opening Instruction No.4, instructing the jury that the

parties were agreed that the earnest monies deposited by MidAmerican included "the 5%
commission" disbursed to Knipe when, in fact, the June 17,2009 Stipulation of the
parties did not so characterize those payments;
(8)

The Court gave Instruction Nos. 11, 12, and 13, incorrectly allowing the

jury to determine that the Employment Contracts were ambiguous and inviting it to
consider extrinsic evidence to interpret them, or, in the absence thereof, to construe the
Employment Contracts against Knipe as the drafting party;
(9)

The Court gave Instruction No. 16, instructing the jury as to the

Robertsons' affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel when the evidence failed to satisfy
the criteria for such affirmative defense;
(10)

The Court gave Instruction No. 20 allowing the jury to find violations of

the ICP A that had no support in the evidence, inadequately instructed on what was
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needed to show a violation of that statute, and ignored the fact that the ICPA was
inapplicable to the present controversy as a matter of law.
Finally, Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the jury's verdict was not a reasonable
adjudication of the controversy, given the unambiguous terms of the Employment Contracts and
the undisputed factual evidence. The law and undisputed evidence also shows that there was no
violation of the ICPA by John Knipe.

II. FACTS
KLC is a licensed Idaho real estate brokerage. The Robertsons own approximately 3,300
acres of rural land in Payette and Washington Counties, Idaho. Richard and Johnnie Robertson
signed an Employment Contract with KLC in 2005 to market the portion of their land titled in
their own names (the "2005 Employment Contract"; Knipe Ex. 4). In early 2007, Robertson
Kennels, Inc. entered into a second Employment Contract, listing the portion of the land titled in
its name for sale by KLC (the "2007 Employment Contract"; Knipe Ex. 17).
Both Employment Contracts contained identical language: "Should a deposit or amounts
paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one half thereof may be retained by you [KLC], as the
broker, as the balance shall be paid to me [the Robertsons]. The Broker's share of any forfeited
deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the commission.,,2
On August 15,2007, KLC and the Robertsons agreed to extend the Employment Contracts'
effective terms until February 28, 2008, and reduced KLC's commission rate on a sale to 5%.

2 The second quoted sentence would place a cap on KLC's share of forfeited earnest
monies. The Court's Instruction No. 11 informed the jury that both sentences were "in dispute."
However, the Robertsons never made any such argument, and the uncontradicted evidence
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KLC procured purchasers for the land covered by the 2005 Employment Contract, the
Harmons. The Harmons signed a contract to purchase that land on November 1,2005 and paid
$50,000 in earnest money. However, their purchase obligation was contingent on the sale of
their own property first. The Robertsons and the Harmons subsequently agreed that $35,000 of
that earnest money was no longer subject to that contingency. Because the $35,000 would no
longer be returned to the Harmons-it would be forfeited if there was no closing and would be
applied to the purchase price of the land if there was a closing-the Harmons and the Robertsons
agreed that it could be dispersed to the Robertsons. The Harmons' real estate agent conveyed the
$35,000 in two payments to KLC, and KLC, in tum, disbursed the money to the Robertsons.
Afterward, however, the Harmons decided they could not purchase the land and terminated their
contract with the Robertsons. (Knipe Ex. 13.) The $15,000 still subject to the purchase
agreement's contingency was returned to the Harmons, but they lost all claim to the $35,000
previously released from the contingency and disbursed to the Robertsons. Neither KLC nor the
Robertsons then mentioned this $35,000 or had any dealings that concerned it until February 19,
2008 when KLC demanded half of it from the Robertsons. (Robertsons Ex. RR.)
The Robertsons next listed the rest of their property with KLC on February 6, 2007 ("the
2007 Employment Contract"). (Knipe Ex. 17.) Like its predecessor, the 2007 Employment
Contract provided that "forfeited deposit[ s] or amounts paid on account of purchase" of the
Robertsons' land would be shared equally by KLC and Robertsons.
KLC found a purchaser for the Robertsons' real property, MidAmerican, and in
September 2007 MidAmerican signed a purchase agreement to buy all the land. (Knipe Ex. 26.)

showed that there was no colorable dispute over whether KLC's "share of any forfeited deposit
or amounts paid on account of purchase" did or did not "exceed the commission."
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That agreement was supplanted the following month by three separate purchase agreements that,
together, provided for a closing in January 2008. (Knipe Exs. 29, 30, 31.) MidAmerican paid
$450,000 on account of its intended purchase in three equal payments in September, October,
and December 2007. Because this money was "nonrefundable," MidAmerican's escrow holder,
with the agreement of all the parties concerned, disbursed the three payments shortly after each
was made by MidAmerican, paying 95% of each payment to the Robertsons and 5% to KLC
(totaling $22,500) as an advance on the 5% commission KLC would be entitled to at the closing.

(See Knipe Exs. 28, 32, 34.)
MidAmerican unexpectedly terminated its purchase contracts on January 25,2008.
(Knipe Ex. 38.) Under' 16 of each of the three land purchase contracts, "SELLER'S
REMEDIES," the Robertsons could either declare MidAmerican's $450,000 "forfeited," demand
monetary damages, or demand specific performance. Richard Robertson agreed at trial that the
Robertsons elected to pursue the first such remedy, regarding the $450,000 as "forfeited."
Mr. Robertson described the portion of MidAmerican's money that he and his wife reported as
personal income on their 2007 federal income tax returns as "EARNEST MONEY
FORFEITED." (Knipe Ex. 43.)
Mr. Robertson wrote to KLC's agent, Rowena Strain, on February 11,2008, stating that
he expected to receive the $22,500 previously disbursed to KLC in anticipation of the closing.
(Robertsons Ex. PP.) This was followed by correspondence between Ms. Strain and John Knipe
concerning when demand should be made for the balance ofKLC's half of the $450,000
abandoned by MidAmerican. They decided that in view of the sensitivity of the issue they
would not bring it up with the Robertsons until after the term of the Employment Contracts had
been renewed. (Robertsons Ex. QQ.) The Robertsons agreed to extend the Employment
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Contracts' terms but then terminated them shortly afterward when they received KLC' s demand
for its share of the forfeited earnest monies. The parties had no further dealings after that, and
the Robertsons kept all the money they had received on account of the Harmon and
MidAmerican land purchase agreements.
After a three-day trial, the jury found that the Robertsons had not breached the 2005 and
2007 Employment Contracts despite the clear weight of the evidence. With no more justification
in the evidence or the law, the jury also found that John Knipe had violated the ICPA and
awarded the $1,000 nominal damages allowed by Idaho Co.de § 48-608(1). The Court then
entered the Judgment in the form proposed by the Robertsons despite Knipe's objection,
inexplicably inviting the Robertsons to make new claims under the ICP A.
III. THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT AS ENTERED IS INCORRECT
AND MUST BE AMENDED

Knipe objected to the form of Judgment submitted by the Robertsons and by this
reference adopts the arguments and authorities stated in that Motion. The Court did not rule on
Knipe's objections but signed the proposed draft without any changes. Knipe therefore moves
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to amend the Judgment, first to eliminate the
recitation of the pleadings in its numbered paragraphs 1,2, and 3. Such a narrative is prohibited
by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) and serves no purpose. All that need be stated is that
KLC is denied relief, that the Robertsons have judgment against John Knipe for $1,000, and that
the Court awards costs and attorneys' fees as subsequent proceedings may determine.
More troublesome is the Judgment's express provision that, notwithstanding the jury's
verdict after a trial of all of the matters the parties placed in controversy, the Robertsons may
assert additional claims under the ICPA, and to facilitate that, the Judgment is not "final." Under
its present wording, the Judgment's finality must await a Rule 54(b) certificate.
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The Judgment misconstrues Rule 54(b). The purpose of that Rule is to make orders that
have resolved some, but not all, of the issues in a controversy "final" and thus appealable. See,
e.g.,

us. v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 528, 988 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1999).

A court should

not, therefore, enter a judgment "pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b)" to specify that it is not final, as the
Judgment does on page 3. Instead, a Rule 54(b) certificate of finality should issue only after an
interlocutory decision resolves some "but less then all of the claims" in a case and an appropriate
motion has been made showing that "there is no just reason for delay" to make that interlocutory
decision "final" and thus appealable. See, e.g., Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 505, 112 P.3d
788, 793 (2005). The Judgment's language about its purported lack of finality is therefore illsuited to the present circumstances. Moreover, the uncertainty it needlessly creates about the
finality of the Judgment will inevitably cause problems determining the deadlines for the parties
to file their post-trial motions under Rules 50(b) and 59(a)(6) and (7), and exercise their right to
appeal. This language should therefore be deleted.
The Judgment also grants the Robertsons the opportunity to submit additional claims for
relief under the ICPA, which they did on or about July 15, 2009. Knipe is unaware of any legal
authority letting a litigant assert new claims after a trial on the merits. The ICP A was placed in
controversy by the Robertsons' Counterclaim, but that only alleged that the provisions of the
Employment Contracts violated the ICP A and those contracts were therefore voidable in their
entirety, and the Ro bertsons asked for no other relief under the ICPA. 3
The Robertsons did not move to amend their pleadings before trial and had the fullest

3 The Counterclaim's Second Count alleged that the $22,500 of MidAmerican's earnest
money that was paid to KLC had been the subject of "tortious conversion" by KLC and John
Knipe. The jury denied that claim.
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opportunity at trial to present all the claims they had under the ICPA. At trial, the Robertsons
seized on evidence that KLC did not demand its share of the earnest money forfeited by the
Harmons and MidAmerican until after Defendant Richard Robertson signed agreements on
February 20,2008, to extend the effective term of the Employment Contracts through the
following September. But the issue of the renewal of the Employment Contracts had been
previously dropped from the controversy when KLC was granted leave to file its First Amended
Complaint, so this evidence had no relevance at trial. After both sides rested, the Robertsons
made an oral motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) to amend their pleadings to
conform to the evidence, which the Court denied.
The jury then determined that only John Knipe, not KLC, had violated the ICP A. The
verdict did not reveal what the jury thought Mr. Knipe had done to violate the statute. However,
the fact that it rejected the Robertsons' demand for a return of the $22,500 and only awarded the
statutory minimum of $1 ,000 against Mr. Knipe makes it clear that the jury's sole concern was
with Mr. Knipe having not demanded the money already owed KLC until after the Robertsons
extended the terms of the Employment Contracts and that the nominal damages allowed by the
statute should be all the relief the Robertsons were entitled to under it. Yet, in clear disregard of
the jury's limited verdict and rulings of the Court, the Judgment grants the Robertsons a new
opportunity to assert more claims under the ICPA against both KLC and Mr. Knipe. There is no
justification for this.
LR.C.P. 54(c) states that "every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings." If the trial court grants relief not specifically plead[ ed]
by the parties, then the issue must be tried by express or implied
consent of the parties. An issue must be tried by express or
implied consent in order to give the parties notice and the
opportunity to present evidence.
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O'Connor v. Harger Constr. Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 911, 188 P.3d 846, 853 (2008) (citations
omitted). See also MK Transp., v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980)).
The Robertsons' claims under the ICPA were fully framed by their pleadings and resolved by the
jury.4 The mere fact that testimony was introduced at trial about the February 2008 extension
agreements and the demand KLC made shortly afterward for the money owed to it does not
mean that the parties had impliedly consented to try the propriety ofthose events as a new cause
of action. '" Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because
evidence relevant to that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the
parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue. '" Hughes v. Fisher, LLC,
142 Idaho 474,483, 129 P.3d 1223, 1232 (2006) (citation omitted). "If a party can show
prejudice by pointing to evidence it would have otherwise introduced or arguments it would have
otherwise made, then that party may complain about a district court's finding based on an unpled
theory." Id. at 484, 129 P.3d at 1233.
Had Knipe been fairly warned that Mr. Knipe's dealings with the Robertsons after
MidAmerican terminated its purchase agreement would comprise a separate claim of relief by
the Robertsons, and was not merely be part of their attack on the credibility of Knipe's two
witnesses or in support of their affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel, Knipe would have
provided additional testimony showing that Mr. Robertson hardly deceived but was, instead,
fully aware of the parties' obligations in February 2008, including, especially, the obligations in
the very Employment Contracts he signed months before. See also Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho

4 In so arguing, KLC does not concede that John Knipe personally violated the ICPA, that
his conduct in February 2008 was properly before the jury, or that its determination that he did
something to violate that statute can stand against KLC's alternative motions for new trial or for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
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187, _ , 191 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Ct. App. 2008).
Just as importantly, Knipe would have emphasized that, as a matter of law, the
Robertsons can have no relief under the ICPA because they had made an election of their
statutory remedies. Idaho Code § 48-608(1) provides that a consumer who purchases services
"and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property ... as a result of the use or
employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by this chapter,
may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative, may bring an action
to recover actual damages or one thousand dollars ($1,000") .... " (Emphasis added.) It was
never disputed that the Robertsons terminated the Employment Contracts as soon as KLC
demanded half of the forfeited earnest money. Under the ICPA's private right of action, the
Robertsons could either sue for monetary damages, including the statutory minimum of $1 ,000,
"or, in the alternative" treat the agreements to extend effective terms of the Employment
Contracts "voidable" as having been deceitfully induced by Mr. Knipe. Having chosen the latter
remedy, they cannot now recover the former too.
Furthermore, the fact that Idaho Code § 48-608(1) would allow a consumer injunctive
"and any other appropriate relief which the court in its discretion may deem just and necessary,"
and that "[t]he court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such
equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper in cases of repeated or flagrant violations," does
not mean that such relief was properly placed in controversy or actually tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties. Idaho Code § 48-608(1) simply allowed the Robertsons to "seek"
injunctive relief, and they had every opportunity to seek all the relief they wanted at trial. They
may not now ask the Court to inject new claims or expand the scope of their relief beyond that
already decided by the jury. The time for that has passed.
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Although Idaho Code § 48-608(1) grants courts the power to award punitive damages "in
its discretion," that statute must be read in concert with the comprehensive scope of Idaho Code
§ 6-1604(2), which specifies that "[i]n all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted,"
punitive damages may not be sought unless the pleadings have first been appropriately amended.
(Emphasis added.) It is the obligation of the Court to construe disparate statutes so that they are
in harmony and "to reconcile and give effect to both statutes if at all possible." Callies v.

o 'Neal, No. 34968, 2009 WL 1929326, at *9 (Idaho July 7,2009); see also Stueve v. N

Lights,

Inc., 118 Idaho 422, 425, 797 P.2d 130, 133 (1990). This can only be done by applying the
procedural requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1604(2)-demanding that "all" civil actions seeking

"punitive damages" be the subject of a proper amendment of the pleadings before trial-to the
evidentiary standard provided by Idaho Code § 48-608(1). The determination in Mac Tools,
Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193 198, 879 P.2d 1126, 1131 (1994), that Idaho Code § 48-608(1)

created a new kind of punitive damages award to "remedy for repeated and flagrant violations of
the ICP A" is not inconsistent with the requirement that such a potentially devastating issue be
placed in controversy in the same orderly fashion that common law punitive damages must be,
rather than being sprung on an unsuspecting defendant after the close of evidence and the entry
of the verdict. 5
In summary, the Court is without power to perpetuate this litigation for the Robertsons'
benefit. All of the matters tried with the express and implicit agreement of the parties have

Tools expressly declined to decide whether the punitive damages allowed by Idaho
Code § 48-608(1) should be the province of the jury or the judge (126 Idaho at 198, 879 P.2d at
1131) so it is not at all certain whether the Court may now unilaterally exercise its "discretion" to
award punitive damages at this late stage of the proceedings. Furthermore, the Robertsons made
no effort to amend their pleadings to allege, nor did they produce any evidence at trial to show,
that any violation ofthe ICPA by John Knipe was "repeated and flagrant."
5 Mac
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resulted in a verdict that fully concluded the controversy. The failure of the Robertsons to
properly amend their pleadings before trial, and the express denial of their motion to do so to
conform to the evidence at the end of the trial, closes the door to continued litigation of the sort
ostensibly still allowed by the Judgment. It must now, therefore, be amended to exclude such
opportunity for additional relief.
IV. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT,
AND A NEW TRIAL IS JUSTIFIED UNDER RULE 59(a)(6)

Knipe alternatively moves for new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6),
because there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict or was otherwise against the law.
To decide a motion made under that rule "the trial judge must 'weigh the evidence and determine
(1) whether the verdict is against his or her view ofthe clear weight of the evidence; and (2)
whether a new trial would produce a different result. '" Harger v. Teton Springs Golf & Casting,
LLC, 145 Idaho 716, 719, 184 P.3d 841,844 (2008) (citation omitted). Unlike Knipe's

alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b), the Court may
grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) where "the trial judge ... has weighed all the evidence,
including his own determination of the credibility of the witnesses ... [and] concludes that the
verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence." Quick v. Crane,
111 Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). The Court is not required to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Robertsons in such an analysis, and may grant a new trial even
if there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Id. at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195.
This case is unusual for how closely the factual testimony offered by both sides agreed.
There was no factual dispute about what documents were signed or about what each document

PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 14
Boise-221700.4 0010908- 00008

ltif fe,O

said. There was no dispute over who paid how much money to whom or when. Fairly
considered, the only area where the testimony of the parties parted company was over their
opinions of what the written terms of the Employment Contracts meant. 6 Therefore, looking to
the evidence dealing with whether the Robertsons had breached either Employment Contract, the
Court must focus on the Employment Contracts' provision that "[s]hould a deposit or amounts
paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one half thereof may be retained by you [KLC], as the
broker, as the balance shall be paid to me [the Robertsons]."
There was no dispute that the Harmons paid $35,000 in nonrefundable earnest money that
was disbursed to the Robertsons before the Harmons withdrew from their purchase agreement
and was kept by the Robertsons afterward. It was similarly agreed (1) that MidAmerican paid
$450,000 in nonrefundable earnest money, 95% of which was disbursed to the Robertsons and
5% of which was paid to KLC before MidAmerican terminated its purchase agreements, and (2)
that, after MidAmerican refused to close, the Robertsons kept all of the money they had received.
Most significantly, Mr. Robertson agreed during cross-examination that the monies paid
by the Harmons and MidAmerican were "deposit[s] or amounts paid on account of purchase" of
the Robertsons' land. He also agreed that when they terminated their respective land purchase
contracts with Robertsons, the Harmons and MidAmerican lost any right to or benefit of the
nonrefundable monies they had previously paid in that connection. Mr. Robertson admitted that
the Robertsons kept all this money and refused to share it with KLC. Mr. Robertson agreed that
the remedy the Robertsons had exercised under the "Sellers' Remedies" available to them under

6 The

Court may set aside, for the moment, evidence concerning when Knipe finally
demanded half the forfeited earnest money, which was relevant only to the Robertsons'
affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel. Because the jury decided that neither Employment
Contract had been breached, it never considered that affirmative defense.
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their land purchase contracts with MidAmerican was to deem the monies previously paid by
MidAmerican "forfeited." (See

~

16 of Knipe Exs. 29, 30, 31.) Mr. Robertson agreed that he

and his wife described the share of MidAmerican' s money that they reported as their personal
income on their 2007 income tax returns as "EARNEST MONEY FORFEITED." (Knipe Ex.
43.)
The Robertsons therefore admitted all the elements of Knipe's case alleging a breach of
the Employment Contracts. The only testimony they produced to evade what should have been
certain liability consisted of the subjective opinion of Mr. Robertson about what the word
"forfeited" meant in the Employment Contract he signed, and the subjective opinion of an
employee of MidAmerican, Cindy Crane, about whether MidAmerican had "breached" its own
separate contracts with Robertsons. For his part, Mr. Robertson opined that neither prospective
purchaser had "forfeited" any money because neither had "breached" their purchase agreement
with the Robertsons. Mr. Robertson did not explain exactly what this was supposed to mean, nor
did he say that it was founded on anything more than a "feeling" he had about what the word
"forfeited" meant. He admitted he did not disclose his personal interpretation of the word's
meaning to anyone even though he said he read both Employment Contracts before signing
them. Of course, neither Employment Contract says anything about an eventual purchaser ofthe
Robertsons' land having to "breach" a future, hypothetical land purchase contract of his own
before KLC and the Robertsons could consider a down payment lost by such a buyer as a
consequence of his refusal to close, as having been been "forfeited."
"Forfeited" is a perfectly ordinary word that does not need "interpretation." The Court
explicitly recognized that when it sustained Knipe's objection to the Robertsons' attempted
cross-examination of John Knipe with a dictionary and then denied the Robertsons' request to
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admit the dictionary in evidence. The courts merely echo the ordinary meaning attached to the
word "forfeited." "In the context of a land sale contract, forfeiture means that if a purchaser
defaults on the payments, any sums paid by the purchaser on the contract of sale are not
reimbursed to him or her." Crowley v. McCoy, 449 N.W.2d 221, 224-25 (Neb. 1989). "The
term 'forfeited' in its usually accepted meaning as applied to rights to property is that they are
taken away, or lost." Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah 1971).
Ms. Crane knew nothing about the Employment Contracts. Instead, she opined that
MidAmerican had not "breached" the land purchase agreements it signed with Robertsons and
therefore had not "forfeited" the $450,000 it paid under the terms of those contracts-even
though she also conceded that MidAmerican had expressly relinquished any claim to that money
in its January 25,2008 letter to the Robertsons, terminating its contracts: "In accordance with
the [October 2007] Agreements, MNEC acknowledges your right to retain the earnest money
amounts already deposited under each Agreement, totaling $450,000, as your sale and exclusive
remedy for this determination." (Knipe Ex. 38 (emphasis added).) Ms. Crane attempted to

explain away this reality by claiming that the $450,000 had "really" been paid to the Robertsons
solely to allow MidAmerican to go onto their property and conduct surveys and examinations to
determine whether it wanted to proceed with the purchase. Of course, Ms. Crane admitted that
no such provision appeared in any of the MidAmerican purchase contracts. To the contrary, she
agreed that ~ 16 of the MidAmerican contracts provided that the earnest money would be
"forfeited" if MidAmerican "refuses or neglects to consummate the transaction within the time
period" agreed to, and that MidAmerican did not, in fact, "consummate the transaction" by the
specified deadline. In any event, what Ms. Crane personally believes the MidAmerican contracts
(none of which were contended to be ambiguous) entailed as far as MidAmerican and the
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Robertsons were concerned is utterly irrelevant to understanding and applying the provisions of
the separate Employment Contracts that were entered into months before either Knipe or the
Robertsons even knew a company like MidAmerican would want to buy the Robertsons' land.
The proposition that prospective purchasers who paid tens and hundreds ofthousands of
dollars to the Robertsons, which money would have reduced the prices they agreed to pay for the
Robertsons' land, but who lost any right to recover that money or have anything else to show for
it as a consequence of terminating their respective deals, did not "forfeit" those monies defies
common sense and plain English. Even more dubious is the Robertsons', and apparently
Ms. Crane's, position that KLC originally intended that KLC would not be able to prove that its
own Employment Contracts had been breached unless itjirst proved that separate contracts
entered into by the Robertsons and third parties for fundamentally different purposes had been
"breached" in some undefined way. 7
Finally, there is the issue of the jury's finding that Mr. Knipe did something that to
violate the ICPA and should pay the $1,000 in nominal damages allowed by Idaho Code
§ 48-608(1). As discussed above, the testimony concerning the February 2008 agreement to
extend the effective term ofthe Employment Contracts could not have been regarded as
something that would support a claim for relief, in and of itself. Such a claim was not alleged in
the pleadings, nor was it properly brought to the parties' attention and tried with their implicit

In denying the Robertsons' second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment claiming that
that the Employment Contracts had been "merged" into MidAmerican's October 2007 land
purchase contracts, the Court found that, "[m]ost significantly, the contracts do not concern the
same fundamental subject matter. While it is true that they both deal with the sale of property
and earnest money, the employment contracts delineate the underlying contractual relationship
and obligations between the Defendants sellers and Plaintiff, their agent, while the Purchase and
Sale Agreements set forth specific terms of the specific sale between the unnamed purchaser
[MidAmerican] and the sellers [Robertson]." (Order on Motions, entered June 9, 2009, at 4.)
7
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agreement. In addition, the relief granted is legally unavailable because the Robertsons elected
the statutory remedies available to them under the ICP A when they chose to treat the
Employment Contracts and the February 2008 agreements to extend their terms as voidable
when Knipe demanded its due.
Finally, it would be a strange moral reversal, indeed, if a person who is owed money by
another should be considered to have acted "deceitfully" by not asserting his legal right to that
money as soon as it became due. How can an individual like Mr. Robertson have been
wrongfully "deceived" about the existence of his own debt to another, when he read and signed
the Employment Contracts that gave rise to that very obligation in the first place? Sharp
business practices that are the concern of the ICPA are one thing, but delaying a legitimate
demand for money already owed, because of a perfectly reasonable apprehension that the obligor
will be aggravated to be reminded of his debt, is not such a practice.
It is frankly impossible to look at such uncontradicted testimony and conclude that the
Robertsons did not breach the Employment Contracts. As will later be argued in more detail,
this evidence justifies the entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but it is decisive for
the purposes of Knipe's request for a new trial.
V. ERRORS OF LAW AT TRIAL JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59(a)(7)
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) states a district
court may grant a new trial for an "error of law, occurring at the
trial." The district judge is vested with wide discretion to grant or
deny a new trial where substantial rights of the aggrieved party are
not affected and that party is not entitled to a new trial as a matter
of right. Where prejudicial errors of law have occurred, however,
the district court has a duty to grant a new trial under Rule
59(a)(7), even though the verdict is supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
Craig Johnson Constr., L.L.C v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797,800-01, 134 P.3d

648, 651-52 (2006) (citation omitted); see also Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 261, 805
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P.2d 452, 467 (1991); Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378, 381, 3 P.3d 56,59 (Ct. App. 2000).
Substantial errors of law prejudiced Knipe's rights and require a new trial.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Court declined to decide whether the
Employment Contracts were ambiguous. Instead, Instruction No. 11 told the jury, over Knipe's
objection, that the provision in the Employment Contracts stating that forfeited earnest monies
would be shared by KLC and the Robertsons was "in dispute," and left it to the jury to determine
what was "intended by the parties" by weighing not only the language ofthe Employment
Contracts but also the circumstances that gave rise to them, the parties' communications, and
their conduct and dealings. Instruction No. 12 told the jury not to ignore the plain and ordinary
meaning of a written agreement but also allowed it to consider extrinsic evidence and testimony
presented at trial to clarify ambiguities. Instruction No. 13 further invited the jury to consider
extrinsic evidence and also instructed it to construe ambiguous contract terms against the party
drafting it if the jurors could not determine the parties' original intent from the extrinsic evidence
heard at trial.
The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is the sole responsibility of the
courttodecideasamatteroflaw. Cannonv. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170P.3d393,396
(2007). Only if a court first finds that an agreement is ambiguous should it ask the jury as the
trier of fact to determine the parties' mutual intent by considering extrinsic evidence.
Farnsworth v. Dairyman's Creamery Ass 'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App.
1994); Sf. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579,581 (1989); Bauchman-Kingston
P'ship, LP v. Haroldsen, No. 34551,2008 WL 5133788, at *2 (Idaho Dec. 8,2008). If the court
decides that the wording in controversy is unambiguous, it should then go on and apply the
contract as a matter oflaw, and not leave that to the jury. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho
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524,527, 181 P.3d 450,453 (2008).
Erroneous instructions do not generally justify a new trial, "unless the appellant can
establish that he or she was prejudiced thereby, and that the error affected the jury's
conclusions." Sherwood, 119 Idaho at 260,805 P.2d at 466. Knipe was unquestionably
prejudiced by these Instructions which, considered as a whole, told the jury it could make
whatever it wanted to of the Employment Contracts' language. Given the verdict, it is unrealistic
to suppose that the jury did not accept Mr. Robertson's personal interpretation of the ordinary
word "forfeited" and give unwarranted weight to Ms. Crane's personal interpretation of her
employer's contracts-in spite of the explicit admission that all the factual prerequisites needed
to grant KLC judgment had been satisfied by uncontradicted evidence and testimony. The Court
should have determined that the Employment Contracts were unambiguous and given the jury
Knipe's requested Instruction No. 15, but it declined to do so.
Beyond the issue of the Instructions, however, the Court failed to fulfill its initial
responsibility to determine whether the Employment Contracts were ambiguous. That alone
justifies a new trial.
The Court instructed the jury in its opening Instruction No.4 that KLC received a "5%
commission" from the three disbursements of money paid by MidAmerican, as a fact the parties
were in agreement with. To the contrary, the Stipulation filed by the parties did not characterize
those payments in that way, but only told the jury that the parties were agreed that of the
disbursements of MidAmerican's earnest money, $22,500 had been paid to KLC and the rest to
the Robertsons. This was not a small distinction, because the Robertsons consistently claimed
that the "Ellsworth Dobbs rule" prohibited KLC from being entitled to anything under its
Employment Contracts because there had not been an actual sale of the Robertsons' land to
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MidAmerican. Branding the $22,500 as a "commission" therefore set the stage for the
Robertsons to argue that KLC had no entitlement to that money and should give it to the
Robertsons. As the Court will recall, Knipe's objection to this opening Instruction before
evidence began was renewed at the beginning of the second day of trial, and the Court then
granted it and asked Knipe to prepare a corrective Instruction. However, at the following
midmorning recess, the Court said it would stick with its original Instruction after all because the
testimony of Ms. Strain it had heard so far was consistent with what had originally been read to
the jury. Thus, the jury was initially told that the parties had agreed to facts that the parties had
not agreed to. When an objection was made, the Court ultimately made what was, in practical
and legal effect, a judgment on a question of fact. Instead, the Court should have given Knipe's
proposed opening Instruction No.5, which faithfully quoted the parties' StipUlation of
undisputed facts.
The Court also improperly submitted the Robertsons' affirmative defense of waiver by
estoppel to the jury by its Instruction No. 16. "The doctrine of implied waiver by silence is
disfavored" in Idaho. Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050
(Ct. App. 1987). Waiver will not be inferred, and the intent to waive must clearly appear from
the evidence. Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256,846 P.2d 904,907
(1993). "A court first must determine whether the facts alleged to constitute waiver are true.
The court then must decide whether these facts, as a matter oflaw, suffice to show waiver."
Soloaga v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 678, 682, 809 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Ct. App. 1990) (citations
omitted). The affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel must also include a showing that the
party asserting this affirmative defense reasonably relied on his opponent's conduct and that he
"'thereby ... altered his position to his detriment. '" Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824,
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136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006) (citation omitted).
The only evidence produced at trial to support this affirmative defense was the silence
that prevailed between the parties after the Harmons terminated their land purchase agreement
and lost the $35,000 in nonrefundable earnest money they had paid. The "detriment" that the
Robertsons claim to have suffered by assuming, on the basis of that silence alone, that KLC
would never enforce the express provisions of the Employment Contracts entitling it to half of
the forfeited earnest money was, improbably, their use of that money to pay their debts and buy
new pickup trucks-which is no hardship and is certainly not giving up what one previously had
a right to keep. 8 The issue ofthis affirmative defense should therefore have never been
submitted to the jury. This is not an entirely academic point, even though the jury never decided
whether the Robertsons had proven this affirmative defense because it decided that the
Employment Contracts had not been breached in the first place. To the contrary, this was
another prejudicial Instruction, reinforcing the invitation to the jury to ignore the plain English of
the Employment Contracts in favor of extrinsic evidence and the Robertsons' witnesses'
subjective opinions.
Next, the Court incorrectly allowed Cindy Crane to testify. Knipe filed a Motion in
Limine prior to trial asking that her testimony be excluded, but the Court denied that Motion as it
denied motions to exclude or limit her testimony at trial. That prior Motion pointed out that
Knipe had served Interrogatories on the Robertsons asking them to identify everyone they

"Legal detriment means giving up something which immediately prior thereto the
promisee was privileged to retain, or doing or refraining from doing something which he was
then privileged not to do, or not to refrain from doing." Hinckley v. Nynex Corp., 144 F.3d 134,
143 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Detriment means giving up
something which immediately prior thereto the promisee was privileged to keep." Worley v.
Wyo. Bottling Co., 1 P.3d 615,622 (Wyo. 2000).
8
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thought had relevant knowledge and to disclose what they believed that knowledge to be. The
Robertsons identified Ms. Crane by name but refused to say what they thought she knew about
the controversy. Ms. Crane's name did not come up in any other pretrial discovery, and there
was no apparent reason to take her deposition. When the Robertsons announced shortly before
trial that they would call her as a witness, Knipe moved under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(e)(4) to exclude her testimony, but that motion was denied, apparently on the grounds that the
Robertsons' needed only to name her and it was up to their opponents to do the rest. Such a
stance effectively neuters Rule 33 and renders it something litigants may honor or ignore as they
please.
It is generally within the trial court's discretion to sanction parties for violations of the

discovery rules. In doing so, the court should impose a sanction that is proportionate to the
offense and serves the dual purposes of encouraging compliance with discovery and punishing
misconduct. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663,667,668,931 P.2d 657, 661, 662 (App. 1996). In this
case, the Robertsons cavalierly ignored a question fairly put to them, capitalized at trial on their
refusal to answer, and suffered no consequences of any sort. At the very least, Ms. Crane should
not be allowed to testify. Such a sanction should, objectively considered, not have been a great
penalty since all she had to testify about was her personal opinions about contracts that were
separate from the contracts between the parties that were actually in controversy.
Having been allowed to testify, the irrelevance of Ms. Crane's opinion permitted
testimony, which Knipe objected to because it was just that, her subjective opinion unsupported
by anything actually written in the MidAmerican land purchase contracts, remains a significant
error of law. Moreover, those MidAmerican contracts were not claimed to be ambiguous and
thus were not in need of interpretation by a witness for any purpose. Such testimony, by a
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purportedly disinterested witness, only reinforced Mr. Robertson's testimony about what he
"felt" the word "forfeited" meant, all at the expense of the plain language of the Employment
Contracts themselves and all to the prejudice of Knipe.
Next, the Court permitted the Robertsons' attorney to cross-examine Rowena Strain and
John Knipe about what Idaho Code § 54-2051 required to be in agreements like the
MidAmerican land purchase contracts. When the Court instructed counsel to refrain from
reading that statute to the jury during closing argument, counsel ostentatiously laid his copy of
the statute on his desk and read from it. This, of course, goes back to what had been the
centerpiece of the Robertsons' defense, the argument that Idaho Code §§ 54-2050 and 54-2051
rendered the Employment Contracts void and unenforceable as a matter of law. The Court
rejected those arguments when it granted Knipe partial summary judgment on February 12,
2009, and again when it denied the Robertsons' second motion for summary judgment and their
motion for reconsideration on June 9, 2009. In any event, the matter can no longer be in dispute
in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Callies, which conclusively found that the
statutes the Robertsons had relied on for so long were regulatory matters for the Idaho Real
Estate Commission to enforce and have no relevance to contract disputes such as this one. (See
Callies, 2009 WL 1929326, at *9 n.7.) The Robertsons' use of those statutes to elicit facially
damaging testimony about what should have been in the MidAmerican land contracts concerning
the division of forfeited earnest monies, but was not, should not have been permitted, and it
could not have helped but substantially prejUdice Knipe at trial.
The Court erred by giving Instruction No. 15, which required Knipe to prove that "a
contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants." The Court had determined in its Order of
February 12,2009, that the Employment Contracts were "valid" and suffered from no legal
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deficiency. That finding was reiterated in the Court's June 9, 2009 Order. Although the jury
presumably found that there were contracts between the parties (otherwise it would not have
found that the Robertsons did not breach them), this Instruction incorrectly telling the jury that
Knipe had to shoulder the burden of yet another item of proof added to the accumulating burden
of prejudice to its case. The Court should have instead given Knipe's requested Instruction
Nos. 7 and 12, advising the jury only what the Court had already determined: that the
Employment Contracts were valid and suffered from no legal deficiency as a matter oflaw. 9
Instruction No. 15 was further deficient in instructing the jury that Knipe had the burden
of proving "the amount of the damages." But the "amount" of damages sought by Knipe was
never in controversy. It sought one-half of the Harmons' forfeited $35,000 and one-half of the
$450,000 forfeited by MidArnerican, minus the $22,500 paid to KLC before January 25,2008.
There was no need to include this issue in the Instructions, and the Court should have instead
given Knipe's requested Instruction No. 20, setting forth these amounts.
Neither should the Court have given Instruction No. 20 allowing the jury to find
violations of the ICPA, but which omitted to mention Idaho Code § 48-603' s requirement that
any violation of the ICPA had to be committed knowingly. For that matter, the Instruction
should have never been given at all because there was no evidence to imply any deceitful
conduct by KLC or John Knipe at any time before February 2008. Indeed, Richard Robertson
testified that he was pleased with everything KLC had done up to that time. The only
conceivable circumstance that might support a claim of unfair dealing was the timing ofKLC's
demand for the money it was entitled to, and, as demonstrated above, that issue was not properly

An instruction that the Employment Contracts suffered from "no legal deficiency"
would have also been important to offset the Robertsons' improper exploitation of Idaho Code
9
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before the Court. It had not been properly raised by the Robertsons in their pleadings or the
course of the trial. It concerned events that were irrelevant to the controversy the parties finally
brought to trial, and was unavailable to the Robertsons due to their election of the remedies
available to consumers under Idaho Code § 48-608(1).
Furthermore, Idaho Code § 48-60 5( 1) provides that nothing in the ICP A shall apply to
actions or transactions permitted under laws administered by any regulatory body of the state of
Idaho. To the extent John Knipe acted unprofessionally, his actions were the concern of the
Idaho Real Estate Commission, and thus not subject to the ICPA. (See Callies, 2009 WL
1929326, at *9 n.7.)
Taken as a whole, the Court's Instructions severely prejudiced Knipe. That unfair
disadvantage was exacerbated by the decision to allow testimony by a witness whose importance
had been deliberately concealed from Knipe, and who, moreover, only testified about her
subjective opinions about contracts that were not directly in controversy. Knipe was further
prejudiced by the Robertsons' improper exploitation of Idaho Code § 54-2051 to elicit ostensibly
damaging testimony that the Robertsons then capitalized on at closing argument. Finally, there
was the Court's failure to decide whether the Employment Contracts were ambiguous and to
either interpret the Employment Contracts itself if they were not ambiguous or correctly instruct
the jury if they were. Taken as a whole, and particularly when combined with the insufficiencies
of the factual evidence previously discussed, these errors of law more than justify a new trial on
all issues.

§ 54-2051.
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VI. KNIPE SHOULD BE GRANTED JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT UNDER RULE 50(B)

The issue to be determined on a motion for j.n.o.v. is whether
substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. Substantial
evidence does not require that the evidence be uncontradicted.
Rather, the evidence need only be of sufficient quantity and
probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the
verdict of the jury was proper. Upon a motion for j.n.o.v., the
moving party admits the truth of all adverse evidence and all
inferences that can legitimately be drawn from it. In ruling on a
motion for j.n.o.v, the trial court cannot weigh the evidence, assess
the credibility of the witnesses, or make its own factual findings
and compare them to those of the jury. The trial court draws all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. The motion should be
granted only where there can be but one conclusion as to the
verdict that reasonable minds could have reached and when that
conclusion does not conform to the jury verdict. The function of a
j.n.o.v. is to give the trial court the last opportunity to order the
judgment that the law requires.
Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, _,200 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations
omitted); see also Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, _ , 203 P .3d 702, 706 (2009); Quick, 111
Idaho at 763-64, 727 P.2d at 1191-92; Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495, 943
P.2d 912,921 (1997). This is a demanding standard, and it should be. However, as noted above,
this case is unusual for the extent to which the parties are in agreement over the relevant facts
and dispositions the Court to grant the relief Knipe now seeks.
Callies has now made it crystal clear that none of the legal defenses the Robertsons
depended upon to invalidate the Employment Contracts apply. Notwithstanding Mr. Robertson's
"feeling" about the meaning of the word "forfeited" and Ms. Crane's subjective interpretation of
unambiguous land purchase contracts her employer did not even draft until long after the
Employment Contracts were executed by the parties to this litigation, the Court must
acknowledge that the crucial sentence in the Employment Contracts speaks in plain English that
does not admit to, or need, any reference to extrinsic evidence to be understood by a reasonable
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layperson. When a contract speaks with such clarity, it is up to the Court, not the jury, to enforce
it as a matter oflaw. Jorgensen, 145 Idaho at 527, 181 P.3d at 453.
An agreement is "ambiguous" only when its words may be "reasonably subject to

conflicting interpretation." Blondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992). It
is clearly reasonable to read the sentence in controversy and apply it as Knipe contends to the
monies the Harmons and MidAmerican paid on account of their land purchase contracts.
However, it is impossible to conceive of what a reasonable alternative interpretation of that
language might be. "Ambiguity results with reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to
... [a document's] ... meaning, however ambiguity is not established merely because different
possible interpretations are presented to the court." McKay v. Boise Project Bd Of Control, 141
Idaho 463, 469, 470, 111 P.3d 148, 154, 155 (2005). A litigant's proposal of an interpretation
that it is frankly unreasonable cannot indicate the existence of ambiguity. Baker v. Farm Bureau
Mut.lns. Co., 103 Idaho 415, 418, 941 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Ct. App. 1997). See also Aerel S.R.L. v.

p.ee Airfoils, LLC,

448 F.2d 899,904 (6th Cir. 2006); Frulla v. CRA Holdings, 543 F.3d 1247,

1252 (lith Cir. 2008) ("If the interpretation urged by one party is unreasonable in light of the
contracts' plain language, the contract is not ambiguous, and the court may not use extrinsic
evidence to vary the terms of the contract."). As discussed above, it is wholly illogical to think
that KLC and the Robertsons originally intended that KLC's eventual entitlement to a share of
forfeited earnest monies would have to depend upon KLC first proving a "breach" of third-party
contracts that had yet to be written and signed by buyers who had yet to be found when each
Employment Contract was entered into. If there is a reasonable alternative interpretation ofthe
sentence in question, the Robertsons have not described it.
The Court cannot ignore Mr. Robertson's unqualified agreement that the Harmons' and

PLAINTIFF/THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 29
Boise-22 I 700.4 0010908- 00008

I ~ 75

MidAmerican's money was paid as a "deposit or on account" of the purchase of the Robertsons'
land, that when their respective land purchase agreements were terminated they lost any right to
or benefit of that money, and that when MidAmerican withdrew from its agreements, the remedy
the Robertsons chose under their contracts with that corporation was to deem the $450,000
"forfeited." And if that were not enough, there is the Robertsons' representation to the United
States government on their 2007 income tax return that the monies they thus obtained were
"EARNEST MONEY FORFEITED."
The factual evidence adduced at trial, applied under the correct legal standard, leads to no
other reasonable conclusion but that the Robertsons breached the Employment Contracts and are
now obligated to share with KLC the money paid by the Harmons and MidAmerican. The only
affirmative defense that might then be recalled to duty is waiver by estoppel. However, as
discussed above, the factual evidence adduced at trial cannot support such an affirmative
defense. First, it depended solely upon silence, and sustaining such a defense on that basis alone
is disfavored in Idaho. The indispensable criteria of this affirmative defense also required the
Robertsons to show that they reasonably relied on the silence and, additionally, acted to their
detriment as a result. While it may be human nature to hope that a creditor's silence means that
the creditor has just forgotten one's debt, that cannot comprise the kind of affirmative conduct by
a creditor that clearly implies a knowing and intentional waiver of a valuable legal right. See
Seaport Citizens Bank, 112 Idaho at 739, 735 P.2d at 1050.
It is even more illogical to argue that debtors acted to their "detriment" when they used

the money that should have been voluntarily paid to their quiet creditor to instead payoff a
mortgage on their land and buy new automobiles. Knipe has been unable to find any reported
case that even discusses such a patently unreasonable argument, let alone supports it.
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Finally, there is the jury's verdict that John Knipe violated the ICP A. As discussed
above, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that the jury was
offended by Mr. Knipe waiting to demand that the Robertsons pay their debts until after the
Employment Contracts had been renewed. However, those events, which were confined to a few
days in February 2008, were irrelevant to the claims the respective parties finally brought into
the courtroom for trial. The Robertsons elected their statutory remedies under Idaho Code
§ 48-608(1) When they terminated the Employment Contracts after demand for the forfeited
earnest monies was made on February 19,2008. Mr. Knipe's conduct as a licensed rea1.estate
agent is the concern of the Idaho Real Estate Commission, as provided by Idaho Code § 48-605.

(ej Callies, 2009 WL 1929326, at *9 n.7.) And careful consideration must be given to the very
idea that a person could be found to have knowingly committed an "unfair or deceptive act[] ...
in the conduct of' his trade by refraining from immediately asking his debtor to do something
that debtor should have voluntarily done anyway. Actions such as that are not what the ICPA
has in mind, no matter how broadly its remedial intent should be implemented.

VII. CONCLUSION
Objectively considered, there has never been much, if any, dispute over the facts bearing
on this case. That, of course, is why the Robertsons strove so consistently to render the
Employment Contracts void on purely statutory grounds, an effort that the Court determined
before trial, and Callies has now confirmed, was misplaced. Unfortunately, the legal certainty
achieved beforehand did not carry through the trial. Thus, the Robertsons were allowed to crossexamine Knipe's witnesses about statutes (Idaho Code § 54-2051) that the Court had already
determined had no application to the present controversy. They were allowed to explain and
interpret a perfectly clear sentence in the Employment Contracts to argue, with obvious success,
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that it did not mean what it said but instead meant what Mr. Robertson privately "felt" it did.
They were allowed to explain to the jury that the terms and implementation of MidAmerican
contracts that the Court had previously determined were fundamentally distinct from the
Employment Contracts nevertheless controlled the meaning and enforcement of those
Employment Contracts, both of which had been signed long before the MidAmerican contracts
were even written.
The uncertainty and confusion engendered by these inconsistencies, compounded by the
Instructions discussed above, at the very least require a new trial on all issues. Indeed, Knipe
believes that once the irrelevant, subjective opinions of Mr. Robertson and Ms. Crane are peeled
away, the admitted evidence that remains leads to only one reasonable conclusion: that
judgment should now be entered in Knipe's favor notwithstanding the verdict.
DATED: July 23 2009.
STOEL RIVES LLP

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe hereby submit this
opposition to Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees.
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 7,2009, the Court entered Judgment in this case, dismissing Knipe Land
Company's ("KLC") Complaint against Richard Robertson and Johnnie Robertson, and
Robertson Kennels (collectively "the Robertsons"). The Judgment determined that only Third
Party Defendant John Knipe violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (Idaho Code § 48-608)
(the "ICPA") and rendered judgment against him in the nominal amount allowed by Idaho Code
§ 48-608(1)-$1,000-even though the Robertsons had claimed that both KLC and John Knipe
had violated that statute. Finally, the Judgment dismissed the claim the Robertsons had asserted
only against John Knipe for the tortious conversion of $22,500 previously paid to KLC with the
Robertsons' agreement.
On July 13,2009, the Robertsons filed a Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees ("Motion")
supported by a Memorandum and Affidavits of counsel, Derek Pica and Robert Wetherell,
asserting they are entitled to $110,307.50 in attorneys' fees and $3,533.34 in costs as a matter of
right and as discretionary costs. These claims are, however, umeasonable and excessive, and fail
to acknowledge the distinct and separate claims in this litigation that they did not prevail on or
achieved only minimal success on. Therefore, KLC requests that the Court deny the Robertsons'
Motion, in whole or in part. Alternatively, KLC asks the Court to significantly reduce the
Robertsons' request.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arose from a dispute over money due pursuant to two Employment
Contracts. 1 KLC alleged that it was owed one-half of all earnest monies paid but later forfeited
by two third-party purchasers of land the Robertsons had listed for sale with KLC as their
exclusive broker. The Robertsons denied that such monies were owed and asserted a
Counterclaim. COUflt One of their Counterclaim named not only KLC, but also KLC's president,
John Knipe, as a third party defendant, alleging that these two parties had breached the ICPA,
without discriminating between the two. That Count alleged two specific violations of the ICPA,
(Idaho Code § 48-603(12) and (13), both of which were disproved at trial), deceptive practices
regarding "entering into" the 2005 and 2007 Employment Contracts, and "unconscionable
methods, acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce" which were not described in any
more detail. The Counterclaim's Count Two claimed that John Knipe, as an individual, had
"wrongfully converted" the $22,500 disbursed from earnest monies paid by the second purchaser
of the Robertsons' land.
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were decided on February 12,2009, the Court
rejecting the legal centerpiece ofthe Robertsons' defense to KLC's claims: that portions of the
Idaho Real Estate License Law, Idaho Code §§ 54-2050 and 54-2051, rendered both
Employment Contracts void and Uflenforceable as a matter of law. The Court held" ... that
both 'employment contracts' between Knipe Land and the Robertsons were valid and suffer from
no legal deficiency. The balance of the issues and claims of both parties fundamentally go to a
course of conduct, which are issues for the jury." Order on Motions for Summary Judgment,

1 For a complete recitation ofthe facts, see Memorandum in Support of Knipe Land
Company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed December 17,2008.
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February 12,2009, at 2. Despite this clear statement of the law and the lack of any new evidence
or newly decided law, the Robertsons invested still more attorneys' fees researching and drafting
two new Motions for Summary Judgment and for Reconsideration on March 30, 2009, arguing
that land purchase contracts the Robertsons signed with a third party for the actual purchase of
their land somehow "merged" the separate Employment Contracts (executed months before) into
these land purchase contracts, rendering the Employment Contracts void. On June 9, 2009, the
Court determined that "[t]here is no new evidence before the Court" and denied both Motions.
The Court then held, for the second time, that the Idaho Real Estate Licensing Law provisions
the Robertsons portrayed as the "statute of frauds" applicable to the present dispute were
inapplicable to the present dispute? (Order on Motions, June 9,2009, at 4, 5.)
After a three-day trial, the jury determined that the Robertsons had not breached the
Employment Contracts and that John Knipe, but not KLC, had violated the ICP A, awarding the
$1,000 in nominal damages allowed by Idaho Code § 48-608(1). The jury found the $22,500
had not been tortiously converted.
III. ARGUMENT

Because the Robertsons were only partially successful in this litigation, KLC and John
Knipe request that the Court decline to award any attorneys' fees or costs. In the alternative,
KLC and John Knipe request that the Court acknowledge the separate claims the jury decided
and apportion and separately determine the reasonable amounts of attorneys' fees, if any, the

2 Undeterred, the Robertsons continued to assert the Licensing Law in their trial brief and
were allowed to exploit Idaho Code § 54-2051 at trial despite the Court's prior rulings. The
inapplicability of the Licensing Law to private controversies such as the one at bar has been
confirmed by Callies v. O'Neal, No. 34968, 2009 WL 1929326 (Idaho July 7,2009).
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Robertsons may be entitled to in connection with each one. To the extent that the Court awards
fees and costs, the amounts sought by the Robertsons must be significantly reduced.
A.

The Court Should Decline to Award Attorneys' Fees and Costs.
Pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)( 1), "the court may award reasonable attorney fees ...

to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l )(B), when provided for by any statute
or contract." Determination of prevailing parties is committed to the trial court's discretion.
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLCv. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 117P.3d

130, 132-33 (2005). Rule 54(d)(l)(B) guides courts' inquiries on the prevailing party question.
Id. at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. That Rule provides:

In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the
costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). When both parties are partially successful, however, it is within
the court's discretion to decline an award of attorneys' fees to either side. Israel v. Leachman,
139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864,867 (2003).3

In their Motion, the Robertsons argue that they should be entitled to the entirety of their
fees and costs even though they failed to prevail in their claim for conversion, citing Shore
v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1115 (2009). In Shore, the Robertsons argue,
the Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision that the defendant was not a prevailing party
because he failed to recover on his defense claim of conversion. The Robertsons, however, omit
mention of critical facts that distinguish that case from the case at hand. In Shore, the defendant
asserted conversion in the alternative to his accord and satisfaction defense. Id. As explained by
the Supreme Court, the district court's decision made no findings on the substance or merits of
the conversion claim, yet the court declined to award fees on the basis that the defendant did not
prevail on his conversion claim. Id at 1125. The Supreme Court aptly noted that the conversion
claim never came into play because the defendant prevailed on his accord and satisfaction
3
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While the Robertsons prevailed in escaping liability under the Employment Contracts,
their success in the balance of this litigation is much more problematic. The Robertsons'
attorneys expended substantial time and money obstinately pursuing claims and defenses that the
Court had already summarily dismissed. Although the Court's Orders on the parties' Motions
for Summary Judgment did not dispose ofthe case, KLC won several key issues as a matter of
law. The remainder went to the jury. While the jury found that the Robertsons did not breach
the Employment Contracts, it also rejected the Robertsons' two counterclaims that the money
disbursed from the second buyer's deposits had been converted or that KLC had done anything
to violate the ICP A. Because KLC was at least partially successful, it respectfully requests that
the Court decline to award attorneys' fees and costs to the Robertsons.
The Court must also acknowledge that, although the parties' competing claims grew out
of the same years-long course of dealing, the suit that found its way to trial in June 2009
contained separate claims by separate parties seeking separate relief. As originally framed, this
lawsuit concerned only contractual claims brought by an Idaho corporation, KLC, against
landowners, the Robertsons. The Robertsons denied liability and asserted a Counterclaim.
However, Count One of the Counterclaim lumped a new Third Party Defendant, John Knipe,
together with KLC, making open-ended allegations of undescribed, deceptive acts violating the
prohibitions enumerated in Idaho Code § 48-603, without substantially distinguishing between
them.

defense, and therefore, the defendant could not have been deemed to have lost that claim. ld. In
this case, the Robertsons' conversion claim was not pled in the alternative, and therefore, the jury
specifically decided the issue in favor of Mr. Knipe.
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Count Two of the Robertsons' Counterclaim was directed solely at John Knipe, claiming
that he had "tortiously converted" the $22,000 that had been disbursed from the deposits paid by
the second purchaser of the Robertsons' land before it backed out of its purchase contract.
The jury decided that Mr. Knipe had violated the ICPA and awarded $1,000 in nominal
damage as allowed by Idaho Code § 48-608. The jury was not asked, and it is therefore not
certain exactly what Mr. Knipe was supposed to have done to violate the statute. However, the
logical surmise is that the jury disapproved of Mr. Knipe's conduct in connection with Mr.
Robertson's February 2008 agreement to extend the effective terms of both Employment
Contracts. Any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the jury's finding that no one
wrongfully retained the $22,500 KLC received before the second purchaser terminated its land
purchase contract with the Robertsons in January 2008. Looking only to Mr. Knipe's dealings
with the Robertsons that occurred after January 2008 to find a violation of the ICPA is also
consistent with Mr. Robertson's testimony that he was satisfied and pleased with KLC's work up
to that time.
The point of this analysis is to distinguish, as the Court must, between the claims the
Robertsons disputed against their original adversary, KLC, and the separate statutory claims they
mounted against John Knipe personally. Put another way, the breaches of contract that formed
the essence of the controversy between KLC and the Robertsons were separate from the statutory
claims they made against John Knipe for allegedly deceptive and unconscionable business
practices that he undertook in his personal capacity. Where such separate claims are made
against separate parties, a court should not "lump" a successful litigant's opponents together but
must instead make a distinction as to whether each claim merits an award or not. See, e.g.,
Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, _ , 191 P.3d 1107, 1115 (Ct. App. 2008). Where different
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· parties to the same lawsuits succeed on separate claims, those claims should be analyzed
separately to determine if attorneys fees are appropriate. Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118
Idaho 108, 113, 794 P.2d 1381, 1386 (1990). "Where parties have each prevailed on different
causes of action tried in the same lawsuit, attorney fees may be apportioned accordingly."
Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 102 Idaho 111, 121,626 P.2d 767, 777 (1981).

The Robertsons' ICPA claims against John Knipe, as an individual, were separate and
distinct from those the asserted against KLC, and, indeed, that is just the way the jury decided
the matter. Given that, and given the foregoing authorities, the Court must distinguish between
the Robertsons' claims against KLC and those against John Knipe. Although they recovered a
verdict against him, it was only $1,000, and that must be contrasted to the open-ended relief the
Robertsons sought against him, personally, under the ICPA. Where there is a substantial
disproportion between the amounts claimed in the pleadings and those recovered at trial, it is
within the Court's discretion not to deem the party recovering such comparatively small sums a
"prevailing party." Burns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 818 P.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1990).
Although Idaho Code § 48-608(5) states that the Court "shall" award "reasonable
attorney's fees to the plaintiff if he prevails," the determination of whether such a plaintiff has,
indeed, "prevail[ed]" remains subject to Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B) and the foregoing law.
Additionally, an award of fees under Idaho Code § 48-608(5) must be "reasonable," and
reasonability must be determined in light of the considerations enumerated in Idaho R. Civ. P.
54(e)(3). Applying these standards, it may be determined that the Robertsons were not
"prevailing parties" insofar as their claims against John Knipe were concerned. They sought
unspecified, open-ended damages from him under the ICPA and, if their Counterclaim is to be
read literally, claimed that Mr. Knipe's personal actions rendered the Employment Contracts, on

PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTSITHIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS FEES - 8

/190

Boise-222074.6 0010908- 00008

which KLC's entire claim depended, void and unenforceable. For all of that, they recovered
$1,000, undoubtedly for conduct that took place after the contractual rights of the parties had
been fully determined, and which, as is more fully argued in KLC's Motion for New Trial or for
JNOV, was factually and legally irrelevant to the case actually tried in June.
The Robertsons have provided little help distinguishing how much of their legal fees
were devoted to pursuing their ICP A claims against John Knipe as opposed to how much were
devoted to defending against KLC's contractual claims. However, given the emphasis placed by
the Robertsons at trial on John Knipe's personal conduct, it is reasonable to estimate that at least
one-third of their fees were focused on this issue, and the Court will be well within its discretion
to find that they were not "prevailing parties" on their ICP A claims against him, just as it will be
well within its discretion to determine that the "reasonable" attorneys fees they are entitled to for
that claim, if any, should be modest and in proportion to the $1,000 they obtained as their sole
relief in that connection.

B.

The Robertson Have Overstated the Costs They Are Entitled to Recover as a Matter
of Right.
The costs a prevailing party is entitled to recover as a matter of right are enumerated in

Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(C). In conformity therewith, the Robertsons are entitled to recover
their filing fee ($71) and the represented cost of the depositions taken in this matter ($1,305.50).

See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(C)(1), (9), (10). But the Robertsons also claim $98.55 for
"[c]opying of exhibits 657 @ 0.15," "[c]opying of exhibits 570 @ 0.15

=

$85.50," "$397.80 for

"[c ]opying 12 sets of 221 jury exhibits," and $31.79 for an "[ e]asel and pad" (see Affidavit of
Robert Wetherell ("Wetherell Aff.") at 3), almost none of which is allowed to a prevailing party
as a matter ofright. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(C)(6) allows only the "[r]easonable costs of the
preparation of ... exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits . .. ," to be awarded as a matter of
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right. (Emphasis added.) At trial, only the Robertsons' Exhibits A, N, 0, Q, R, T, U, V, KK,
MM, PP, QQ, RR, and IT were admitted in evidence. Those admitted exhibits amounted to 27
pages of copied documents, which, at the Robertsons' claimed cost of $0.15 a page, comes to a
total of $4.05. The remainder of costs claimed for copied "exhibits" must therefore be
disallowed Similarly, the Robertsons' "easel and pad" was not admitted into evidence as an
exhibit, so that claim should also be disallowed.
In summary, the Robertsons may only claim their filing fee, deposition costs, and cost of
preparing the documents actually admitted in evidence, as costs they are entitled to as a matter of
right. These costs total $1,380.50.

C.

All of the Robertsons' Claimed Discretionary Costs Should Be Disallowed.
The Robertsons have claimed discretionary costs consisting of copying (presumably

including the copying charges they erroneously claimed as a matter of right, as discussed above),
postage, mileage, and meals for their attorneys, and their cost of the mediation ordered by the
Court, totaling $1,647.01.
Discretionary costs may include copying costs and travel expenses, but on a showing by
the claimant that such expenditures were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred,
and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." Idaho R. Civ. P.
54(d)(1)(D). The Robertsons have made no effort to demonstrate that any of these costs was in
the least bit "exceptional" and should, "in the interest of justice," be awarded to them.
This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost
be "exceptional" under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those costs
incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional. In
Great Plains Equip., the Court specifically noted that discretionary
costs, including those for expert witness fees, were "exceptional
given the magnitude and nature of the case .... " Certain cases,
such as personal injury, cases generally involve copy, travel and
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expert witness fees and such that these costs are considered
ordinary rather than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D).
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P .3d 161, 168 (2005) (citations

omitted).
Travel between attorneys' offices in Boise and the courtroom in Payette hardly qualifies
as an extraordinary circumstance, and the copying of documents for litigation purposes is even
more routine. Presumably, attorneys have to eat no matter where they are trying a case, so those
costs should be disallowed. Finally, rather than being something "exceptional," it is the
consistent policy of the courts to encourage mediation as a vehicle for the settlement of litigation,
so that claim should be disallowed, too. Idaho R. Civ. P. 16(a)(6).
D.

The Attorneys' Fees Sought by the Robertsons Are Unreasonable, Duplicative, and
Excessive.
If the Court awards attorneys fees and costs to the Robertsons notwithstanding the above

argument, the amount sought by the Robertsons must be significantly reduced for the reasons set
forth below.
1.

Legal Standard Guiding an Award of Attorneys Fees.

"The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court."
Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580,592,917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996). This amount may

be more or less than the sum the prevailing party is obligated to pay its attorney. See Nalen v.
Jenkins, 114 Idaho 973, 976, 763 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Ct. App. 1988). What constitutes a

"reasonable" fee is a discretionary determination for the trial court, to be guided by the criteria of
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3). Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 263, 999
P .2d 914, 918 (Ct. App. 2000). "A court is permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time
and labor expended by the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the
figures advanced by the attorney." Craft Wall ofIdaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704,706,
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701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct. App. 1985). "Hence, a court may disallow fees that were unnecessarily
and unreasonably incurred .... " Daisy MIg. Co., 134 Idaho at 263,999 P.2d at 918.

2.

The Attorneys' Fees Sought by the Robertsons Are Excessive and
Unreasonable.
a.

The Billing Entries Obscure a Reasonability Analysis.

The fee applicant should exercise good "billing jUdgment" when submitting an
application for fees and "should maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a
reviewing court to identify distinct claims." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,437 (1983).
The summary of fees and costs provided by counsel for the Robertsons contains several blockbilled entries, which fail to allocate what time was spent doing each task. By failing to properly
itemize each task, counsel for the Robertsons obscured any attempt to evaluate whether the time
dedicated to each task was reasonable. For example, there is a time entry for 3.8 hours ($760)
for an associate, Bradley S. Richardson. (Wetherell Aff. Ex. A at 4.) The entry next to the
charge reads: "Travel to trial to provide impeachment evidence reo John Knipe and trial support
reo impeachment of Plaintiff s real estate agent." It appears from the entry that the associate
charged for travel to Payette (which is nearly a one-hour drive from Boise and a one-hour drive
back) but performed only 1.8 hours of legal services at the trial. There is no indication of exactly
what those legal services consisted of-an oversight recommending their disallowance.
Another example is a time entry by Mr. Wetherell on June 25 for 16.20 hours ($4,050)
that reads: "Travel to Payette, attend trial, take verdict and return travel to Boise." ld. It is
impossible to tell exactly what took 16.20 hours. Derek Pica, who accompanied Mr. Wetherell
that day, billed 12.5 hours for travel and attend trial. (Affidavit of Derek Pica ("Pica Aff.") Ex.
A, last page.) Moreover, the date in question was the last day at trial. As the Court will recall,
trial started at 8:30 a.m. The jury returned its verdict around 6:00 p.m., after about two hours'
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deliberation. Allowing two hours for travel to and from Payette, one comes up with
approximately what Mr. Pica charged, but that leaves about four hours ofMr. Wetherell's time,
or $1,000, unaccounted for. That additional charge should be disallowed.
h.

The Billing Summaries Reflect Duplicative Billing.

The Court should further note that Mr. Richardson was the third attorney present and
billing at trial on both June 25 and 26. This case is a conventional breach of contract case, and
three attorneys (two of them having over 20 years of experience each) billing simultaneously
were not necessary for trial. The unique aspects of this controversy were almost entirely legal
and largely decided by the Court in the pre-trial Motions. Nevertheless, the fee summary reflects
that Mr. Wetherell alone accrued thousands of dollars in legal fees on June 19 and 20, getting up
to date on this case in the final hours before trial. (See Wetherell Aff. Ex. A.) As if that was not
sufficient, a third attorney, Mr. Richardson, also accrued thousands of dollars merely reviewing
and analyzing documents in the record and meeting with clients to review the facts. (Jd.) In this
connection, one should also note that Mr. Richardson's billing rate is only $50 an hour less than
his senior colleague's, even though Mr. Richardson graduated from law school in 2004, while
Mr. Wetherell has nearly 26 years of experience. 4 It is therefore appropriate that Mr.
Richardson's hourly rate be reduced to $150.
Finally, deciding to add two new attorneys to their trail team on the Friday before trial
began was the Robertsons' decision. KLC should not be burdened with the cost of the
inefficiencies inherent in having brand new counsel frantically familiarize themselves with topics
that had been the subject of months oflitigation by the parties' original counsel. The Robertsons
undoubtedly had their own reasons for indulging in this sudden expansion of their representation,
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but that does not mean that all of the additional costs so incurred are reasonable, given the
overall complexion of the case. It is therefore reasonable that the total award of fees claimed by
the Robertsons should be reduced by at least 15% as an acknowledgement of the inefficiencies
inherent in managing their case in such a chaotic manner.

c.

The Robertsons' Request for Paralegal Fees Is Excessive and
Unreasonable.

The Robertsons' petition for fees includes a request for paralegal services performed by
Lorinda Tuttle at a rate of $140 per hour. The Robertsons provided no authority to support that
this is a reasonable rate for her services. Although Mr. Wetherell's affidavit describes Ms. Tuttle
as having years of experience, he fails to specify whether Ms. Tuttle received paralegal training.
(Wetherell Aff. at 6.) In fact, Ms. Tuttle's rate is only $35 per hour less than that charged by Mr.
Pica, the attorney who handled the majority of the case and who has over 20 years of experience
as an attorney. (See Pica Aff. at 5.) Moreover, the tasks performed by Ms. Tuttle appear to be
administrative in nature and do not justifY her rate. Specifically, Ms. Tuttle spent over 20 hours
and accrued over $2,800 in legal fees for doing Internet research on individuals on the jury panel.
(See Wetherell Aff. Ex. A. at 2,3,5.) KLC does not dispute the recovery of paralegal time

where appropriate; however, clerical and administrative matters do not merit $140 per hour.

3.

The Court Should Deny the Robertsons' Request for Fees and Costs Related
to Their Second Motion for Summary Judgment as Well as Their Motion to
ReconsiderlMotion for Clarification, as the Motions Were Duplicative and
Unnecessary.

Despite a clear ruling from the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment, the Robertsons filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment as well as a Motion to
Reconsider and/or Motion for Clarification. Despite the absence of any new evidence or any

4

This information was derived from Mr. Wetherell's law firm's website.
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previously-unavailable law, Mr. Pica incurred more fees in researching, drafting, and preparing
for a hearing on a Motion to Clarify the first Summary Judgment and a second Motion for
Summary Judgment based on authority that was easily accessible when the first Motion was
submitted, but which was overlooked. Indeed, Mr. Pica's Summary of Fees and Costs reflects
thousands of dollars dedicated to researching and drafting those motions-motions that should
never have been filed with the Court. (See Pica Aff. Ex. A, entries between Mar. 6,2009, and
May 15,2009.) It is worth repeating that in denying both the Robertsons' second Motion for
Summary Judgment and the Robertsons' Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Clarification,
the Court explained "[t]here is no new evidence before the Court ...." Therefore, the
Robertsons' Motions were brought without proper justification.
Mr. Pica used a form of block-billing that makes it impossible to determine the exact
amount of time dedicated to these two unnecessary motions. However, a reasonable estimate
based on the entries is $8,200. This amount should be deducted from any award of fees to the
Robertsons.
4.

To the Extent the Court Determines the Robertsons Were the Prevailing
Parties in Connection with Their ICP A Claims against John Knipe, Their
"Reasonable" Attorneys' Fees Should Be Limited and in Proportion to the
Relief Obtained on Each Claim.

As argued above, the Robertsons' ICPA claims against John Knipe were separate and
distinct from the controversy between them and KLC. The former was based on purposely
nebulous allegations of deceptive and unconscionable conduct by an individual, while the latter
claims were firmly centered on the execution and performance of the two Employment
Contracts. Consequently, the Court is obligated to evaluate this claim separately; to decide who,
if anyone, prevailed in connection with each one; and to separately determine the reasonable
amount of fees due in connection with each one.
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The Robertsons' attorneys have provided only their billing sheets, which, by and large,
make little distinction between their efforts to impugn John Knipe's integrity to show a violation
of the ICP A, and the efforts that were clearly concerned with the Employment Contracts
themselves. Nevertheless, of the factors to be considered under Rule 54(e)(3), it would appear
that subsection G is most relevant: "[t]he amount involved and the results obtained."
The Robertsons did not demonstrate any financial loss that they experienced as a result of
any supposedly deceptive conduct by John Knipe. Ultimately, "the results obtained" against him
consisted of $1,000. This nominal sum recommends, first, that the Court find that the substantial
proportion oflegal fees that was undoubtedly devoted to attacking John Knipe be isolated from
the balance of the fees claimed by the Robertsons, and, secondly, that what is a "reasonable"
amount of those fees be determined strictly within the terms of the ICPA claims the Robertsons
asserted against that individual. Given that the only relief obtained is $1,000, and that it
apparently concerned conduct that had a merely tangential (if any) relationship to the
controversy actually at bar, KLC and John Knipe first assert that the total amount of fees claimed
be reduced by one-third (approximately $36,000), such being a reasonable allocation of the work
devoted to the ICPA claims against John Knipe. Further, application of the factors set forth in
Rule 54(e)(3) recommends that the fees that may then be awarded in connection the Robertson's
claims under the ICPA should not exceed $5,000.
E.

Settlement Negotiations Have No Impact on an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs.
Rule 54(d)(1 )(B) provides that "[i]n determining which party to an action is a prevailing

party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment
or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." As specifically
stated, the Rule contemplates the relief sought by the respective parties in their original
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complaint, not settlement negotiations. See Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 754,86 P.3d 458,
468 (2004) ("This Court has repeatedly held '[a] trial court's consideration of failed settlement
negotiations, or of a refusal to negotiate a settlement, when deciding whether to award attorney
fees is prohibited under Idaho law.'" (citation omitted; brackets in original»; Braley
v. Pangburn, 118 Idaho 575, 583, 798 P.2d 34,42 (1990) ("[T]here is no authority in a trial court
to insist upon, oversee, or second guess settlement negotiations, if any, and certainly no authority
to impose sanctions for bad faith bargaining." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted»;

see also Smith v. Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 29,830 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1992).5 The Robertsons'
citation to Lake v. Purnell, 143 Idaho 818,821, 153 P.3d 1164, 1167 (2007), is misplaced, since
that opinion dealt with the demand requirement specifically imposed by Idaho Code § 12-120(4)
with respect to personal injury claims for less than $25,000.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Robertsons should be prevented from recovering any attorneys fees or costs incurred
in this litigation, as both parties were partially successful. Furthermore, they are entitled to
recover only about one-third of the cost their claim, both as a matter of right and as a matter of
the Court's discretion. In any event, the determination of whether they were prevailing parties in
their claims against KLC must be separated from the determination that must be made with
respect to their ICPA claims against John Knipe as an individual. However, even if the Court
elects to award the Robertsons attorneys' fees and costs in this action, the amounts requested by
the Robertsons in connection with the two disparate claims that were given to the jury must be

5 The unwarranted emphasis placed by the Robertsons on settlement negotiations
nevertheless compels KLC and John Knipe to inform the Court that, rather than adopting the
conciliatory pose asserted in their brief, the Robertsons demanded that KLC pay them $100,000
to settle just before trial began.
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reduced significantly for the above-stated reasons. KLC and John Knipe therefore respectfully
request that this Court deny the Robertsons' Motion, or, in the alternative, significantly reduce
the amounts sought by the Robertsons.
DATED: July £1,2009.
STOEL RIVES LLP
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Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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